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 The current study examined the role of attention in prospective memory.  Prospective 
memory refers to the ability to form an intention to do something in the future, such as email a 
colleague, and additionally remembering to do so at the appropriate moment.  Theories of 
prospective memory retrieval suggest that attention is required to complete an intention.  
However, the exact role of attention and whether it is always required remains unclear.  One 
challenge in examining the allocation of attentional resources in prospective memory is that a 
direct measure of these resources does not exist.  The current study attempted to address this 
issue by introducing methods applied in the area of visual attention (i.e., eye tracking).  The 
results of the current study suggest that attentional resources beyond those required for the 
ongoing task were not necessary to complete the intention.  In addition, the methods employed 
shed new light on the relationship between visual attention and the cognitive resources deployed 




Chapter 1 Introduction 
 Prospective memory (PM) refers to our ability to form an intention to do something in the 
future, such as pick up laundry from the dry cleaners, and additionally remember to do so at the 
appropriate moment, for example on the way home from work.  The importance of PM is evident 
in our ability to remember to take medications, to deliver a message to a friend, or to remember 
to drop off your child at daycare.  The consequences of forgetting to carry out an intention can 
range from being a nuisance in your day to something more severe such as death.  In 2003, a UC 
Irvine professor forgot to drop his son off at daycare and instead went to work and mistakenly 
left his son in the back seat of the car.  His son later died due to heat exhaustion (Carey, 2003; 
Cowan, 2005).  This unfortunate case is an example of how dire the consequences of forgetting 
to carry out an intention can be.  How is it that we can forget such an important task just as easily 
as we can forget a trivial task?   What is it that allows us to remember, at the appropriate 
moment, that we need to fulfill an intention?  What is it that prompts us to recall an intention 
once that moment has passed? Researchers that study PM are concerned with these issues and 
the cognitive processes that underlie them. 
To better understand the issues surrounding PM, researchers conduct experiments in both 
natural settings and laboratory settings.  Through research three types of PM intentions have 
been identified, time-based, activity-based, and event-based intentions (e.g., Kvavilashvili & 
Ellis, 1996; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).  In time-based tasks individuals are required to carry 
out the intention at a specific time, such as in three minutes or today at 6:00 pm.  Activity-based 
intentions are to be completed following another task.  The third and most widely studied type of 
intention requires one to complete the intention when an external cue is presented, from here 
forward called the PM cue.  For example, it may be the case that you need to deliver a message 
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to a friend and decide that the appropriate time to do so will be when you see him at a dinner 
party tonight. Seeing your friend (PM cue) in the appropriate setting (dinner party) signals you to 
tell him the message.  In laboratory versions of PM tasks participants are usually occupied by an 
ongoing task after they receive the PM intention.  This is done to simulate the task demands of 
everyday life, such as engaging in a conversation with others at the dinner party.  The current 
study focuses on laboratory event-based PM tasks and the role of attention in these tasks.  
The role of attention in event-based PM tasks is of major debate among theorists.  One 
view suggests that success in event-based PM tasks requires the allocation of attentional 
resources to monitor the environment for the PM cue and subsequently retrieve the intention 
from memory.  If these resources are not employed, the cue will be missed and the intention will 
not be carried out at the appropriate moment (e.g., Guynn, 2003; Smith, 2003).  In contrast, 
others suggest that the conditions of the task set determine whether these resources are required 
to fulfill the intention.  For example, the characteristics of the PM task, the characteristics of the 
ongoing task in which the PM task is embedded and individual differences can all affect whether 
cognitively demanding attentional resources or more automatic processes can be used to fulfill 
the intention (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).  Researchers have found contradicting results 
regarding the use of these resources under almost identical experimental conditions.  Therefore, 




Chapter 2 Theories of Prospective Memory 
2.1    Monitoring in Prospective Memory 
2.1.1    Preparatory Attentional and Memory Theory 
 Smith and colleagues have argued that attentional resources are always used in PM tasks 
to monitor for the PM cue (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith, Hunt, McVay & 
McConnell, 2007).  These attentional resources have been labeled preparatory processes, in the 
Preparatory Attentional and Memory Processes Theory (Smith 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004).  
This label is intended to reflect the fact that these processes are thought to prepare the individual 
to complete an intention.  In addition to preparatory processes, automatic processes that aid in 
the detection of the PM cue and completion of the intention may also occur.  However, complete 
reliance on automatic processes will not result in successful completion of an intention.  In 
laboratory PM tasks, the participant’s performance in an ongoing task provides a measure of 
preparatory processes.  For example, Smith (2003) found that participants who had to complete a 
PM task in addition to making lexical decisions (determining if presented letter strings formed 
valid English words or nonwords) were significantly slower at making these decisions than 
participants who only completed the lexical decision task (LDT).  Critically, response latencies 
on non-PM cue trials in the LDT were longer for participants with a PM intention.  It is 
important to note that PM trials were excluded because participants are expected to slow down 
when the PM cue is presented.  Presentation of the cue is likely to initiate retrieval of information 
related to the cue in addition to any thoughts related to the ongoing task, thus slowing the 
participants’ responses on these trials (e.g., Marsh, Hicks, Cook, Hansen, & Pallos, 2003).  
 The results also showed a relationship between PM performance and response latencies 
in the LDT: PM participants who were faster in the LDT showed poorer PM performance.  The 
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results suggested that when participants did not take the time to properly engage preparatory 
processes to monitor the environment for the PM cue, they were more likely forget to perform 
the PM action upon presentation of the cue.  In addition, participants who showed the most 
accurate PM performance also scored higher on a counting span task, a measure of working 
memory capacity (Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 1982).  These results suggested the PM task 
required attentional resources that were more readily available for participants with high working 
memory capacities.  Together they suggest that preparatory monitoring processes are required to 
successfully fulfill an intention and that these processes are drawn from a pool of limited 
attentional resources. 
Smith et al. (2007) meticulously investigated numerous conditions, recognized by others 
(e.g., Einstein, McDaniel, Thomas, Mayfield, Shank, Morrisette & Breneiser, 2005), as suitable 
for evoking spontaneous detection of the cue and retrieval of the intention.  They examined 
conditions where preparatory processes are not theoretically required to complete an intention.  
In these experiments participants completed two blocks of the ongoing task and were either 
assigned to a control group or PM group.  Participants in the control group were never given an 
intention.  In contrast, those assigned to the PM group received an intention after completion of 
the first block.  They were told they would have to complete the intention during the second 
block of the ongoing task.  A depiction of the experimental design can be found in Table 1.   
Smith et al. (2007) consistently found a cost of having to complete an intention. 
Specifically, control participants improved from Block 1 to Block 2 in the ongoing task by 
reducing their response latencies.  In contrast, participants in the PM groups did not show these 
practice effects, instead their reaction time performance remained the same across the blocks.  
The authors argued that participants in the PM groups were using limited resources to monitor 
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for the cue which prevented them from improving in the ongoing task.  However, it is 
noteworthy to mention that the cost of maintaining an intention systematically decreased when 
an increasing number of conditions thought to evoke automatic processing of the cue were met.  
Nonetheless, Smith and colleagues have taken painstaking effort to create conditions to eliminate 
preparatory attention, but have failed to do so, leading them to conclude that preparatory 
attentional resources are necessary to successfully complete intentions in event-based PM tasks.  
Table 1  
Experimental Design (Smith et al., 2007). 
 
     Group Assignment  
 Control Prospective 
Block   
1 Lexical Decision Task Lexical Decision Task 
2 Lexical Decision Task 




2.1.2    Two-Process View 
Similar to Smith (2003), Guynn (2003) suggested that attentional resources may be 
required to complete an intention, but that monitoring may occur in two forms, maintaining a 
retrieval mode and checking for the cue.  Tulving (1983; 1998) coined the term “retrieval mode” 
to explain cognitive and neurocognitive functions that occur to treat stimuli as information to be 
retrieved.  According to this view, a retrieval mode is a prerequisite for the actual retrieval 
process: retrieval of information cannot occur unless stimuli are demarcated as information to be 
retrieved and the individual is prepared to treat them as such.  Guynn (2003) paralleled a 
prospective retrieval mode to Tulving’s (1983; 1998) retrieval mode, in that a prospective 
retrieval mode may serve as a prerequisite to identify stimuli as PM cues to prompt retrieval of 
the intention.  Guynn (2003) refers to this as strategic monitoring which may involve 
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maintaining an activated state of awareness to respond to PM cues and actively checking the 
environment for the cue (i.e., preparatory processes) where the former process may occur by 
itself or in combination with checking.  The combination of the two processes is thought to 
occupy more attentional resources than simply maintaining a retrieval mode and thus will impose 
greater costs to the ongoing tasks.   
Guynn (2003) created a novel design to explore whether monitoring exists in two forms.  
The ongoing task was a short-term memory task where participants were shown five words in a 
row for 5 sec and were given 4.5 sec to recall the words in the order they were presented (from 
left to right).  In addition, participants performed a serial reaction time task where they pressed a 
key that corresponded to the on screen location of an asterisk.  When the correct key was pressed 
the asterisk moved to one of three other locations on the computer screen.  Participants were told 
to perform the asterisk task as quickly and accurately as possible while studying the words for 
the memory task.  According to the authors, the serial reaction time task required attentional 
processes that are also engaged in strategic monitoring during PM tasks.  Thus, performance on 
this task should be impaired when participants are given an intention.  To assess strategic 
monitoring under these conditions, participants were instructed to press the Enter key if they saw 
a word that was a fruit during the memory task.  Trials composed of the two ongoing tasks 
served as control trials and trials where a PM cue may appear constituted experimental trials.  
The number 2 was displayed at the top of the screen on control trials, indicating that only the two 
ongoing tasks were to be performed.  The number 3 was displayed at the top of the computer 
screen on experimental trials, indicating that a PM cue may appear.  The PM cue appeared on 
one sixth of the experimental trials.  Participants then completed separate blocks of control only 
trials, experimental only trials and mixed trials. 
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According to Gyunn’s predictions, if strategic monitoring involves two processes, 
checking for the cue should only occur when the cue is expected to appear, i.e., on experimental 
trials.  In contrast, evidence of maintaining a retrieval mode should occur any time an intention is 
given.  Thus performance in the serial reaction time task should be affected on control and 
experimental trials in the mixed block and all trials in the experimental only block.  Accuracy 
and reaction time in the serial reaction time task were best in the control only block, intermediate 
in the mixed block and worst in the experimental only block.  Because performance was 
significantly worse on all experimental trials, the results established that participants only check 
for the cue (perform a search for a fruit word) when they are in a context where they expect the 
cue to appear.  In contrast, participants seemingly maintained a retrieval mode for the duration of 
the experiment anytime they were given an intention, regardless of context and expectation as 
shown by the intermediate performance in control trials of the mixed block.   
Guynn’s results suggest that monitoring is not one-dimensional, and that task demands 
will affect the extent to which different monitoring processes are engaged.  Importantly, Guynn 
did not investigate whether automatic processes can also be used to complete an intention.  
Furthermore, evidence for the mental processes that compose strategic monitoring are inferred 
and not directly measured.  In summary, the results do suggest that monitoring is a two process 
function, but they leave unclear the role of automatic processes in event-based PM tasks and the 
precise roles of the checking and maintenance functions. 
2.2    The Multiprocess View 
 In contrast to Smith’s (2003) theory, McDaniel and Einstein (2000) identified several 
conditions that are likely to reduce or eliminate the use of attentional monitoring processes in 
event-based PM tasks.  The qualities of the PM task, the qualities of the ongoing task in which 
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the PM task is imbedded, the amount of planning involved, and individual differences can all 
affect the extent to which monitoring or automatic processes will be used to complete the PM 
task.  For example, monitoring should be reduced when there is less importance on the PM task 
compared to when the PM task is very important.  In comparison, when the ongoing task is very 
difficult or engaging, there are likely to be fewer resources available to monitor the environment.  
Thus, the degree to which participants are occupied by the ongoing task will also affect the 
amount of monitoring found in the experiment.  To reflect their belief that some conditions 
require the use of attentional resources and that others do not, they refer to their framework as 
the multiprocess view.  
Although the multiprocess view generally describes conditions that theoretically should 
reduce or eliminate the need for attentional monitoring, it does not identify exact conditions that 
will lead to automatic processing or spontaneous retrieval of the cue versus those that always 
require attentional resources.  Einstein et al. (2005) attempted to disentangle these conditions.  
Specifically, they investigated the effects of 1) cognitive load by presenting either one or six 
cues, 2) importance by placing moderate or high importance on the prospective task, and 3) focal 
versus nonfocal processing.  Focal processing occurs when the ongoing and PM tasks require 
similar cognitive processes.  For example, focal processing is expected to occur when detection 
of the cue is semantic and the ongoing task also requires semantic processing.  In contrast, 
nonfocal processing would occur if detection of the PM cue requires processing the physical 
characteristics of the stimuli and the ongoing task requires semantic processing (e.g., Marsh, 
Hicks, & Hancock, 2000).  Focal processing is predicted to eliminate the need for attentional 
resources because detection of the PM cue should not require attentional resources beyond those 
needed to complete the ongoing task.  Consistent with their predictions, Einstein et al. (2005) 
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found that focal processing, moderate emphasis on the PM task, and decreasing the cognitive 
load associated with the PM task (i.e., making the task easier) all reduced or eliminated the cost 
associated with having an intention, as measured by response latencies in the ongoing task and 
prospective performance.  Participants in these conditions were not significantly slower in the 
ongoing task compared to when there was no intention.  In addition, prospective performance 
was equivalent across the conditions.  For example, performance in the moderate and high 
emphasis conditions corresponded with each other.  The authors suggested that the pattern of 
results showed that participants were not monitoring for the cue and were able to automatically 
and spontaneously retrieve the intention.  However, monitoring and automatic processing was 
inferred from the reaction time data and prospective performance. 
To directly test for spontaneous retrieval, the authors compared processing of the PM 
cues when the intention to respond to them was suspended, to a condition where participants 
were never given an intention to respond to the cues.  The rationale was that spontaneous 
retrieval should occur even when the ongoing task conditions do not meet the criteria to carry out 
the intention. Participants in this experiment completed two blocks of trials.  In a control block 
they were given a target word and told to remember it for a later memory test.  In a separate PM 
block, they were also given a target word, but told that they should press a button (Q) on the 
keyboard if they encounter it during an imagery rating task.  In the PM block participants 
completed an LDT and were told to ignore all other task demands and to respond as quickly as 
possible during the LDT.  Importantly, the PM target unexpectedly appeared during the LDT 
instead of during the expected imagery rating task.  Participants were significantly slower to 
respond on these surprise trials when they were given an intention to respond to the target even 
though they were instructed to ignore the PM task until the imagery rating task.  Einstein et al. 
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(2005) proposed that the slowing experienced on the surprise trials in the LDT were due to 
participants spontaneously retrieving the intention when the PM cue was encountered.  This 
spontaneous retrieval interfered with ongoing performance on that trial.  Notably, latencies on 
nontarget trials in the LDT were not statistically longer in the PM block than in the control block, 
suggesting that having an intention did not result in the engagement of monitoring processes 
throughout the task as would be predicted by preparatory attention theory.  
The results from this study demonstrated that PM retrieval can occur even when an 
intention is not an active part of the task and therefore when monitoring is neither necessary nor 
engaged.  These results are in direct contrast to those obtained by Smith and colleagues (2003; 
Smith & Bayen, 2004; Smith et al., 2007).  Considering the results surrounding monitoring in 
event-based PM tasks, the question remains as to why some find evidence of it and others do not.  
2.3    The Issue of Discrepant Findings  
It is clear that preparatory attention theory and the multiprocess view make different 
predictions regarding the importance of attentional resources in event-based PM tasks; however, 
the discrepant findings surrounding the actual use of these resources is a major issue for PM 
researchers.  Smith and colleagues have consistently found evidence of monitoring when 
participants were given an intention to do something in the future (2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004; 
Smith et al., 2007).  Monitoring, measured indirectly as a cost to the ongoing task in which the 
PM task was embedded, was observed even when precaution was taken to ensure the “best” 
chances of evoking spontaneous processing of the cue (Smith et al., 2007).  Conversely, others 
have shown that the amount of monitoring devoted to complete an intention can be reduced or 
even eliminated (Einstein et al., 2005).  
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Therefore, the first goal of the current proposal is to further specify conditions under 
which monitoring versus spontaneous processes occur in PM tasks.  The major difference 
between the two prominent views of event-based PM surrounds the attentional resources 
allocated to monitoring.  For this reason alone, determining the conditions that will reliably 
support spontaneous processes will help to advance theories of event-based PM.  One issue 
surrounding the discrepant finding is the complexity of PM tasks.  A second issue that is not 
always considered in PM tasks is the participant’s perceptions of the PM task and ongoing task 
and a third issue may be the use of a noisy dependent measure of monitoring .  I will discuss 
each of these issues in more detail in the following sections. 
2.3.1    The Complex PM Task 
 According to Ellis (1996), there are several stages involved in fulfilling a PM intention.  
The first stage is the creation of an intention or task to complete in the future such as picking up 
laundry from the cleaners.  An intention may be self-initiated or it may be created by someone 
else for you to complete.  The second stage is the retention interval.  Using the dry cleaning 
example, this could be the period between when you wake up and form the intention, and when 
you leave work.  The third stage is the performance interval.  This refers to the context or point 
in time when the intended action should be carried out, after work in the example.  Once the 
performance interval is identified, the fourth stage requires steps to start and execute the 
intention.  In the example, this would involve taking the route to the cleaners (initiation of the 
intention) instead of the normal route home.  On the way to the cleaners you must then remember 
to stop and pick up the clothes (execution of the intended action) rather than continuing on the 
route.  The fifth stage involves evaluating the outcome to prevent repeating completed intentions 
or to ensure that postponed or uncompleted intentions will be fulfilled in the future or cancelled.  
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As is clear from Ellis’ description of the different stages involved in PM tasks, 
successfully completing an intention is complex.  This complexity also makes it difficult to 
measure the many cognitive processes that may be involved.  Although Smith and colleagues 
and McDaniel and Einstein and colleagues have attempted to replicate each other, slight 
differences in the experimental design may have artificially contributed to some of the discrepant 
results.  For these reasons it is essential to design experiments that can tease apart the processes 
involved in the different stages of a PM task.   
2.3.2    Attention Allocation Policy 
 A second potential issue that is not typically addressed in the literature is that of the 
participant’s perception of the task set.  Marsh et al. (2005) attempted to clarify how this may 
also affect monitoring.  Upon receiving the instructions for the experiment, it is likely that 
participants estimate the difficulty of having to detect the PM cues(s) while additionally 
performing the ongoing task.  Based on this initial assessment of the task set, participants decide 
how much attention should be directed toward the ongoing task.  The authors refer to this 
assessment as “attention allocation policy”.  They further suggest it is likely that participants 
may adjust their attention policies throughout the course of the experiment as they gain 
familiarity with the task.  Importantly, any costs associated with maintaining an intention are 
thought to be influenced by the participant’s perception of the task set.  
 It may be the case that previous studies did not take into account participants’ 
expectations of the task set, which have contributed to the contrasting findings in the literature.  
One possibility is that evidence of automatic processing was found in conditions where 
participants allocated the majority of their resources to the ongoing task because they expected 
that they could automatically detect the PM cue or that the PM task was less important (as in the 
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moderate emphasis condition of Einstein et al., 2005).  In contrast, it is possible that participants 
were reluctant to allocate their attention to the ongoing task even when the multiprocess view 
predicts automatic processing of the PM cue, because the task set was not viewed as suitable for 
relying on automatic processes.  It need not be the case that people always explicitly evaluate the 
difficulty of the task set to determine how to allocate their attention.  In some circumstances, 
people may have a feeling regarding how to approach the task, or as they gain experience in the 
task, they may naturally alter how they allocate attention within the task set (Hicks, Marsh, & 
Cook, 2005; Marsh et al. 2005).  Marsh et al. (2005) suggested that even when retrieval 
conditions are theoretically appropriate to initiate automatic processes, some people may choose 
to allocate more attention to the PM task than is actually needed.  In some cases, the use of 
average response latencies as an estimate of monitoring may reflect individual differences in 
attention allocation policies.  In fact, Einstein et al. (2005) created a single PM condition and 
divided participants in this condition into subsets of those whose responding in the ongoing task 
slowed when they were given an intention and those whose responding sped up compared to 
when there was no intention.  They found that PM performance was equivalent for the groups 
and that performance in the ongoing task was not sacrificed for those who were faster in the 
ongoing task.  These results suggested that there are some individual differences that may reflect 
differences in participant strategies or ability that may not be accounted for in most studies of 
prospective memory.   
One way to mitigate differences in allocation policies is to tell participants where their 
attention should be focused.  This may not eliminate the effects of allocation policies but it is 




2.3.3    A Noisy Dependent Measure 
 Conservatively speaking, monitoring processes devoted to intentions are believed tap a 
pool of shared resources which reduces available resources for other tasks (e.g., McDaniel & 
Einstein, 2000; Smith, 2003).  However, it is unlikely that the involvement of these attentional 
resources will always be under the participant’s awareness (Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2007).  
Because monitoring processes are often, if not always, unaware to the participant when they are 
employed, it is necessary to use a sensitive measure of monitoring.  A measure that is commonly 
used to estimate monitoring is the average response latency in an ongoing task.  This measure is 
thought to reflect the contribution of monitoring processes without relying on explicit measures 
such as prospective performance and ongoing task accuracy (Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2007).  
However, it can be argued that response latencies do not directly measure the cognitive processes 
carried out in PM tasks.  Marsh, Hicks, and Cook (2005) note that response latencies are 
sensitive enough to detect monitoring, but they may also tap attentional factors that are not 
directly related to the processes used to complete the intention or the ongoing task.  For example, 
momentary lapses of intention (e.g., West & Craik, 1999) where attention is not directed at any 
part of the task set and stimulus-independent thoughts (Teasdale, 1989; Teasdale, Dritschel, 
Taylor, Proctor, Lloyd, Nimmo-Smith, & Baddeley, 1995) where unrelated thoughts come to 
mind may confound response latency data.  Furthermore, Smith (2003) has argued that when 
monitoring is not found, either the dependent measure was not appropriate, or there was not 
sufficient power for detecting these processes (Smith et al., 2007). 
Eye movement data may be able to detect off-task behaviors that would normally 
influence the response latency results in the form of noise.  For example, off-task behaviors can 
be inferred from response latencies as longer reaction times for some trials, but because eye 
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movement data is so rich (one can obtain speed of eye movements, number of fixations on and 
off the stimulus of interest, the duration of the fixations, ect.) they may provide a more accurate 
measure of these differences than response latencies.  Because PM tasks are so complex and 
performance may be influenced by a number of variables, it can be difficult to differentiate 
monitoring processes from other cognitive processes.  The second goal of the current study is to 
create a more direct measure of monitoring through the use of eye movement data.  Research in 
the area of visual attention has shown that eye movements and visual attention are tightly linked 
(e.g., Hoffman, 1998; Irwin, 2004).  If the attentional resources that are used in monitoring 
processes are similar to those used in visual attention, eye movements may provide a more 
accurate measure of attention than response latencies in an ongoing task by accounting for the 
influence of variables that typically contribute noise to the results. 
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Chapter 3 Visual Attention and Prospective Memory 
3.1    Eye Movements as a Measure of Attention  
 Because the reported discrepancies regarding the use of monitoring processes occur 
under similar experimental conditions, a better way to account for and prevent them may be to 
create a more direct way to measure monitoring.  Results from visual attention studies present a 
strong case for using eye movements as an estimate of attention.  Irwin (2004) provides a 
summary of results supporting this notion.  Basic support for this view comes from evidence 
showing that people tend to look at, or fixate, a stimulus in order to obtain information from it.  
One reason for this is that the human visual field is limited by physical properties of the eye as 
well as by cognitive capacity limits.  Irwin (2004) notes that these limitations force us to direct 
visual our gaze and attention to specific stimuli or specific areas within the visual field.  
A review of the literature by Corbetta (1998) revealed extensive evidence from 
psychological, functional anatomical, and cellular studies suggesting that the neural networks for 
directing attention and moving the eyes heavily overlap.  The review included evidence that 
ruled out the possibility that visual attention and eye movements are completely independent 
functions; however, there was not enough evidence to conclude whether the two systems either 
partially overlap or are operated by the same mechanism.  The findings from this review support 
the idea that eye movements and visual attention are related.  Thus, if monitoring in prospective 
memory is considered to be an attention demanding function, measuring eye movements in a 
visually based PM task may provide a more direct measure of monitoring processes.  
3.1.1 Covert vs. Overt Attention 
One caveat to using eye movements as an estimate of attention is that attention can be 
focused in two ways: first, by overtly orienting attention (i.e., looking at the stimulus) or by 
covertly directing attention, meaning that attention is directed or guided without eye movements 
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(e.g., Henderson, 2006; Hoffman, 1998; Irwin, 2004).  Another way of stating this is that overt 
orienting occurs any time the head or eyes move to improve perception whereas covert orienting 
refers to changes or shifts in attention that are not a result of overt orienting.  Both orienting 
mechanisms can occur reflexively, in response to stimulus presentation, or through a slower, 
more controlled response.  Reflexive orienting typically occurs in response to stimuli presented 
in the periphery and automatically draws attention.  In contrast, cues that evoke slower controlled 
responses are typically presented in the center of the screen and have some type of response goal 
associated with them.  These cues are thought to be processed within conscious awareness and 
responding is voluntary (Johnson & Proctor, 2004).  Both overt and covert orienting can occur in 
similar ways, but measuring each mechanism is slightly different.   
Because overt attention necessarily requires one to move the eyes and in some cases the 
head, eye movements and fixations are justified measures of overt orientation.  There are also 
data which suggested that covert visual attention can be measured through eye movement data.  
Covert attention is thought to affect the output of the visual system by directing attention to 
specific locations or items (Johnson & Proctor, 2004).  For example, the benefit of covert 
attention can be seen in faster response latencies to locations where visual attention has been 
cued (cf., Johnson & Proctor, 2004, for a review) as well as in faster saccadic reaction times (cf., 
Hoffman, 1998, for a review). Saccades are brief eye movements that naturally occur about three 
to four times per second, and can be influenced by information in the periphery.  For example, 
when reading it is common for saccades to be made to words that are about to be read.  When 
such saccades occur, it allows readers to skip over high frequency short words (such as if, the, or, 
etc.), and allows the reader to recognize the next word faster than when saccades are suppressed 
by presenting one item or word at a time.  This reduction in processing time for next-in-line 
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items is thought to be a result of covert attention (Hoffman, 1998).  Similar results have been 
obtained with other paradigms.  In a cuing paradigm, validly cuing the location of a target led to 
shorter saccadic reaction times (saccades to the cued location are faster) to the target than when 
the cues were invalid (e.g., Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2009; Posner, 1980).  Thus, there is 
evidence that both overt and covert attention can be assessed through eye movements, overt 
through direct measures and covert through the influence of cues on processing speed. 
Monitoring in prospective memory is thought to be an attention demanding strategy that, 
similar to visual attention, can be consciously employed at times and other times may occur 
through unconscious processing (Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 2007).  Therefore, it is plausible that 
monitoring in a visual event-based PM task will be reflected by overt and/or covert shifts in 
visual attention that can be measured through eye movements.   According to the Multiprocess 
View, salient PM cues such as those that seem to appear abruptly, should reduce or eliminate 
monitoring processes because they are noticed automatically and evoke spontaneous retrieval of 
the intention.  Some support for this notion can be found in the literature on visual attention. 
Early research seemed to suggest that the sudden appearance of a target (an onset) 
immediately captured attention (e.g., Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Yantis & Jonides, 1984).  The 
results from these studies suggested that subjects were able to immediately recognize onset 
items, but needed to perform a serial self-terminating search for targets that did not have a 
sudden onset.  Thus, it appeared that abrupt visual onsets were rapidly detected and likely 
automatically recruited visual attention.  In aforementioned research, Yantis and Jonides required 
participants to make a saccade to detect the targets.  The results further suggested that abrupt 
onsets captured attention which led to faster detection of cues by guiding eye movements to 
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onset locations.  In other words, when attention is captured, the oculomotor system and overt 
attention are likely to reflexively follow.  
Yantis and Jonides (1990) set out to further test the role of stimulus onset in attentional 
capture by creating two necessary criteria for automatic capture: First, attention should be 
captured regardless of the difficulty of the task (load-insensitivity criterion), and second, 
attention should be captured regardless of whether the individual’s goals coincide with the onset 
(intentionality criterion).  The authors cite support for the load-insensitivity criterion, but neither 
prior research nor the results from their study supported the intentionality criterion.  Abrupt 
onsets automatically captured attention regardless of the difficulty of the task, but when attention 
in their study was highly focused, the effect of onset was attenuated.  These results suggested 
that when covert attention is focused elsewhere, overt attention may not be automatically 
captured by onsets.  This finding is relevant to the current study because it suggests that a PM 
cue that abruptly appears may not reflexively capture attention as proposed by the multiprocess 
view.  If this is the case, such a cue would not be sufficient to evoke spontaneous processing and 
thus, may not be a fair test of whether an intention can be completed without attentional 
resources.  
However, research suggests that this may not present an issue for the current study.  First, 
some research indicates that covert attention is responsible for the preparation but not execution 
of eye movements.  This is referred to as premotor theory (Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & 
Umiltà, 1987;  Rizzolatti, Riggio, & Sheliga, 1994).  Second, Wu and Remington (2003) found 
that the effect of stimulus properties on both covert and overt attentional capture were not purely 
stimulus driven mechanisms, were sometimes differentially affected by stimuli, and can be 
modulated by top-down processes.  However, stimuli with transient properties such as onsets did 
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have similar effects on covert and overt attentional capture.  This suggests that when there is a 
goal to attend to a transient stimulus property such as onset or a change in color, top-down 
processes encourage detection of the change and the onset will ensure that both attentional 
systems are captured similarly.  
In summary, visual attention can be oriented in two ways, overtly and covertly.  Although 
covert and overt attention may operate somewhat independently of each other, both can be 
assessed through eye movement data.  Because monitoring is considered to be an attention 
demanding process, it is likely that monitoring in a visual PM task can be measured through 
overt and covert shifts in attention.  Therefore, it is expected that eye movement data will 
provide a more accurate estimate of monitoring in a visual event-based PM task than current 
measures alone.  
3.2    Eye Movements as the New Measure of Monitoring 
West, Carlson and Cohen (2007) applied logic from the visual attention literature to 
determine whether prospective performance was affected by a rich visual environment.  
Specifically, the authors examined the number of fixations to objects associated with a goal to 
respond, i.e., those with intentions (to determine how often objects were fixated), the duration of 
the first fixation (to determine the amount of initial processing on an item), and total fixation 
duration (to determine the full amount of processing given to displays with and without targets).  
Participants performed a visual search task where they were required to search for letters 
presented within a horizontal string of six letters.  Participants determined whether the display 
contained a PM cue (M or D), a regular target (one of the remaining 18 consonants) or neither.  
PM cues were identified at the beginning of the experiment.  Targets were identified at the 
beginning of each trial.  There were 3 blocks of 76 trials.  Each block consisted of 30 target-only 
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trials, 30 distractor only trials, 8 prospective-only trials, and 8 target-plus-prospective trials.  On 
target only and prospective only trials, a single target or PM cue was embedded among five 
distractors.  On, target-plus-prospective trials, a single target and one PM cue appeared.  On 
target-plus-prospective trials, participants were told to respond to the PM cue and not the target.  
The results indicated that participants looked at PM cues the longest, distractors the 
shortest, and regular target looking times fell in between on all trial types (i.e., target only, 
prospective only, target-plus-prospective and distractor only).  The authors suggest these looking 
times indicate the amount of online processing for each stimulus type.  The authors were 
particularly interested in the total duration of fixations on PM cues and targets on target-plus-
prospective trials.  The results of this comparison showed that fixation durations were longest for 
the stimulus that participants responded to.  In other words, when participants made a PM 
response they looked at the PM cue for a significantly longer duration than the target.  In 
comparison, participants’ fixation durations were significantly longer for targets when they 
incorrectly responded to the target over the PM cue.  West et al. (2007) inferred that the retrieval 
of response information resulted in longer fixation durations for the stimulus type that was 
responded to, PM target or regular target.  
One particular interest of this study was to determine to what extent a failure to fixate the 
PM target results in a failure to carry out the PM intention.  The results showed that PM miss 
trials were not solely the result of not fixating the target.  On prospective only and target-plus-
prospective trials, the probability of fixating missed PM cues was greater than zero, suggesting 
that failing to complete an intention was caused by a failure to engage in strategic monitoring 
processes as well as  failing to orient overt attention toward, i.e., look at, the PM cue.  In other 
words, failing to complete the intention was not solely the result of not seeing the PM cue.  Total 
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fixation durations were also longer for PM hits than PM misses, bolstering the notion that 
monitoring processes were not engaged when the PM cue was missed even on trials where the 
cue was fixated.  These results suggested that prospective performance in this paradigm not only 
relied on overt attention (fixating the cue) but also on attentional processes that bring the 
intention to mind when the PM cue is encountered.  There is clearly a host of rich data to be 
obtained from eye movements to estimate the cognitive processes associated with prospective 
remembering.  Importantly, these data show the value of implementing new techniques to 
measure the cognitive processes involved PM tasks.  
However, the West et al. (2007) results do not provide insight into the effects of having 
an intention on the ongoing task before the PM cue has been encountered.  There were several 
drawbacks to their design.  First, there was no control comparison group.  Smith (2003) argued 
that contrasting an intention group to a no-intention control is the comparison of interest when 
investigating the use of preparatory attention in a PM task.  More specifically, the intention 
group may be slower, or in this case, likely show a different pattern of eye movements compared 
to the control group if monitoring resources are used.  Second, the design encouraged monitoring 
because participants were required to search for two types of stimuli, regular targets and PM 
cues, on every trial.  However, it is worth noting that West et al. (2007) were concerned with the 
extent to which a rich visual environment would affect prospective performance, not comparing 
the cognitive resources needed to complete an intention versus when no intention is given.  
The work of West et al. (2007) clearly indicate that eye movement data accurately assess 
the cognitive processes employed in PM tasks and  provide a more detailed account of these 
processes over conventional  response latency measures.  Specifically, eye movement data may 
allow a distinction to be made between different monitoring processes because eye movements 
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are more directly related to monitoring for a visual cue than response latencies.  As Guynn 
(2003) proposed, it is possible that monitoring involves both checking for the cue and 
maintaining a PM retrieval mode.  For example, if response latencies in the ongoing task are 
longer for the PM group compared to a control group with no intention, but there are no 
differences in the number of times the groups look to the location where the PM cue is expected 
to appear, the results would bolster the notion that monitoring involves two processes.  
Specifically, this outcome would suggest that under the conditions of the experiment participants 
maintain a retrieval mode, but do not overtly check for the cue.  Consequently, it is crucial to 
create a PM cue that appears in a separate location than the ongoing task in order to dissociate 




Chapter 4 Overview of the Current Study 
In the previous sections of this document, the argument was made that monitoring in a 
visually based prospective memory task may be observed through shifts in visual attention.  To 
make this point even more obvious, consider a time-based prospective memory task where one is 
required to carry out the intention at a specific time (noon) or within a specific time interval (the 
next ten minutes).  In this situation, a direct measure of strategic monitoring, and overt orienting, 
is to evaluate how often an individual checks the clock to see whether they need to carry out the 
intention.  Conversely, there may be times when an individual thinks about the intention and/or 
what time it may be without checking the clock.  Results indicate that better prospective 
performance in this scenario is associated with an increase in clock checking, i.e., monitoring, in 
the time period before the intention should be executed (e.g., Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; 
Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn, & Cunfer, 1995).  The inclusion of eye movement data 
was expected to indicate whether monitoring in a visual event-based PM task operates in a 
similar fashion as it does in time-based PM tasks, where prospective performance inherently 
relies on monitoring.  Importantly, the PM cue and the ongoing task in the current study 
appeared in different screen locations which allowed the cognitive processes related to the 
ongoing task to be separated from those related to the PM task. 
4.1    Overview of the Ongoing Task  
In the current study participants engaged in a lexical decision ongoing task (LDT) where 
they were asked to decide as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy whether presented 
letter strings form valid English words or nonwords.  The LDT was centered horizontally either 
at the top or bottom of the computer screen which was divided into a three by three grid.  The 
LDT was used as the ongoing task because it has been used in other PM studies and has been 
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reported to be sensitive enough to detect monitoring.  Participants engaged in two blocks of the 
LDT: A baseline block where they performed the LDT by itself and a performance block where 
they were additionally given an intention to complete while engaged in the LDT.  On two trials 
during the baseline block, the grid opposite the LDT stimulus changed color.  The change also 
occurred during the performance block and served as the PM cue.  As previously mentioned, the 
screen locations of the PM cue and ongoing stimuli needed to be separated in an attempt to 
distinguish between the attentional resources allocated to each task.  Figure 1 displays an 
example screen shot of the LDT slide on both regular and change trials. 
 
Figure 1  
Example Lexical Decision Slide 
 
4.2    Overview of the Prospective Task 
Participants were given the intention to press a button each time the box opposite the 
LDT stimulus changed colors.  One unique feature of the current design is that the location of the 
PM cue was well defined by the grid background and changes occurred within the participant’s 
visual field.  Thus, the changes could be detected without looking directly at the box.  This 
feature is noteworthy because overtly orienting attention is not required to detect the change.  
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Therefore, when overt shifts in attention toward to color box occur they directly reflect checking 
for a change in the color box.  Differences between the PM and control groups in eye movements 
toward the color box can be attributed to strategic monitoring in the form of checking for the cue. 
Although attention can be focused overtly or covertly, the changes in the box color are 
assumed to engender transient properties, and thus are expected to capture both attention 
mechanisms (Wu & Remington, 2003) for the following reasons.  First, changes in stimulus 
properties (color and luminance) of the color box are significant.  Second, the box is large and 
noticeable changes in its properties should appear to be abrupt for this reason alone.  Last, the 
change occurs very infrequently which should make the change feel salient to the observer.  For 
similar reasons, the change is expected to encourage automatic processing of the PM cue because 
participants can rely on the experimental context to grab their attention and signal them to stop 
the current task and perform the prospective task instead of relying on attention demanding 
monitoring processes to search for the cue. 
Due to contradictions to the multiprocess view, the proposed design may reduce 
monitoring, but may not eliminate it.  First, the PM task is not focal to the ongoing task.  
Detecting a perceptual change in the color box requires cognitive processes different from those 
needed to determine if letter strings create English words.  Therefore, attentional resources are 
required to stop the cognitive processes in operation for the ongoing task in order to initiate the 
cognitive processes needed to complete the PM task.  Second, the PM instructions generally state 
to press a button anytime the color box changes colors as opposed to telling them to press a 
button anytime the color box changes to red or blue.  Typically, specifying the PM cue should 
facilitate automatic processing of the cue because it precisely defines the moment when the PM 
cue will appear (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; 2007).  For instance, instructing participants with 
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an LDT ongoing task to press a button when they encounter the word rabbit should facilitate 
automatic processing of the PM cue compared to instructing them to press a button anytime they 
encounter an animal word.  The latter instructions require two steps: determine if the stimulus is 
a word, and if it is a word, further determine if it represents an animal.  Specific instructions, 
however, only required one step: determine if the presented item is “rabbit”.     
Despite the predictions of the multiprocess view, changes in the color box are expected to 
automatically draw attention, and in doing so spontaneously initiate cognitive processes related 
to the intention (e.g., retrieval of the action).  Changes in the color box are salient and distinct 
from the other components of the experiment.  Distinct cues are predicted by the multiprocess 
view to aid in spontaneous retrieval (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; 2007).  The visual attention 
research and results from pilot data suggest that the salience of the cue may supersede the issue 
of having nonfocal tasks.  The results of a pilot experiment showed that 98% of participants 
noticed that the box changed colors.  Additionally, the majority of participants were able to 
correctly recall the colors that appeared and the number of times it changed.  The participants 
were not warned about the changes, yet were accurately able to report them.  These findings 
establish that the changes automatically captured attention. 
Likewise, the specificity of the PM instructions should not present a problem for the 
current study.  Using specific instructions to respond to a semantic cue is thought to reduce 
monitoring because it reduces the cognitive load associated with detecting the PM cue.  In 
contrast, leaving the color change unspecified actually makes the PM task easier.  Instructing 
participants to respond to any color change allows them to respond anytime there is a change.  In 
this case, specifying that they respond to red increases the cognitive load associated with the PM 
task because participants need to remember to attend to the change, and also to discriminate 
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between different changes in order to only to respond to red.  General instructions may reduce 
the load associated with detecting a perceptual change, and for this reason, should reduce 
monitoring.  Finally, in the current study participants experienced the change during the baseline 
block.  According to Marsh, Hicks and colleagues, attention allocation policies are thought to be 
heavily influenced by experience with the task set (Hicks et al., 2005; Marsh et al., 2005).  Thus, 
experience with the color change should alert participants to the ease with which changes can be 
detected allowing them set an attention allocation policy that discourages the use of monitoring 
processes. 
 The final component to the prospective task was an emphasis manipulation that was 
included to address individual differences in attention allocation policies.  There were three PM 
groups each with different instructions about which task, ongoing or PM, was most important.  
The first group was a standard PM group instructed to respond to changes in the box color.  In 
addition, there was an ongoing emphasis group instructed to respond to changes in the box color, 
but to place importance on the LDT.  In contrast, the final PM group, the prospective emphasis 
group, was instructed to respond to changes in the box color, but to place importance on 
remembering to carry out the intention.  Placing emphasis on the ongoing task was expected to 
reduce monitoring for the PM cue.  Conversely, placing emphasis on the PM task should 
increase monitoring because available resources should be devoted to the PM task (e.g., Einstein 
et al., 2005; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).  The emphasis manipulation was implemented to 
investigate the boundaries surrounding the use of monitoring processes and to alleviate the 
nuisance effects that one’s perception of the task set may have on monitoring.  For example, 
instructing participants to place emphasis on one task over the other may eliminate the 
propensity to allocate attention to both the ongoing and PM tasks.  The emphasis manipulation 
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should reduce individual differences in how people choose to allocate attention, and thus allow 
for a purer measure of monitoring that is not muddled by participant expectations.  Lastly, there 
was a no-intention control group which never received an intention against which all the other 
groups were compared.  
4.3    Dependent Measures 
The dependent measures for the current study were prospective performance, accuracy 
and average response latencies in the LDT, eye movements, and a set of measures that were used 
to predict prospective memory performance and monitoring.  Prospective performance assessed 
whether the emphasis manipulation differentially affected prospective memory in the current 
design.  Accuracy, response latencies, and eye movement data from the LDT assessed 
monitoring processes.  As previously mentioned, response latencies do not allow the two 
monitoring processes, checking for the cue and maintaining a retrieval mode, to be easily 
dissociated.  Eye movements were included to directly assess checking behaviors, while 
evidence of a retrieval mode can be inferred from both response latencies and eye movement 
measures when overt checking did not occur.  Comparing response latencies in the ongoing task 
while excluding trials where the color box was looked at were expected to indicate whether 
participants given an intention instantiated a retrieval mode without the influence of potential 
checking processes (Guynn, 2008).  However, excluding trials where the color box was looked at 
was not necessary, because most participants never fixated the color box, even when it changed 
colors.  The final set of measures were included to assess whether differences in working 
memory capacity, the ability to inhibit irrelevant information, and perceptions of the task set can 
predict prospective performance and the engagement of monitoring processes.  Refer to 
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Chapter 5 Predictions 
 The main goal of the current study was to determine whether an intention can be 
completed without sacrificing performance in an ongoing task.  To address the numerous counts 
of discrepant results reported in the literature regarding the issue, eye movements were included 
as a novel and more direct measure of attention.  Predictions regarding the use of attention in the 
current study are discussed within the frameworks of Preparatory Attentional and Memory 
Processes Theory and the multiprocess view.  Both views predict similar performance in the 
baseline block for all groups because the instructions were the same up to thas point.   
5.1 Preparatory Attention Predictions 
According to Preparatory Attentional and Memory Processes Theory, attentional 
resources are required to successfully fulfill a PM intention.  As a result, participants in the PM 
groups were expected to show costs to the ongoing task that the control group does not 
experience.  First, the PM groups should show similar or slower response latencies in the 
performance block compared to the baseline block.  In contrast, the control group may show 
improvement in the performance block of the LDT in the form of faster response latencies 
compared to their baseline performance.  Second, costs to the ongoing task are also expected to 
manifest in the eye movement data.  For example, the response latency costs expected for the PM 
groups may be a result of PM participants requiring longer fixation durations and/or simply 
making more fixations before giving a response.  In other words, having an intention is expected 
to slow the cognitive processes used to make lexical decisions resulting in less efficient 
processing of the LDT stimuli evidenced by the eye movement results.  Because the PM 
emphasis instructions implicitly encourage monitoring, this group may show greater costs to the 
ongoing task in both response latencies and eye movements than the other PM groups.  Essential 
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to these predictions is that all of the PM groups are expected to show costs to the ongoing task 
that the control group does not experience.   
The costs of monitoring to the ongoing task as a result of having an intention are also 
expected to conversely benefit PM performance.  When these resources are not effectively 
devoted to the PM task, participants will fail to complete the intention.  Consequently, the 
emphasis instructions are expected to influence PM performance.  For instance, the ongoing 
group may devote too much of their resources to the ongoing task leaving an insufficient amount 
for monitoring processes, the outcome being poorer prospective performance for this group 
compared to the other PM groups.  Altogether, the PM groups are expected to show costs to the 
ongoing task and a supplementary benefit to the PM task as a result of engaging in monitoring 
processes. 
Theories of working memory suggest that one of its functions is to control attention.  
Those who are higher in working memory capacity tend to exhibit better control of attention 
(Baddeley, 2007; Cowan, 2005; Unsworth & Engle, 2007).  Following this line of reasoning, 
working memory capacity should predict prospective performance.  As previously noted, Smith 
(2003) found that participants higher in working memory capacity were more likely to complete 
an event-based PM task.  Operation span (Ospan) was included as a measure of working memory 
capacity which should be positively correlated with prospective performance replicating Smith 
(2003).  Ospan has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of working memory capacity 
(Klein & Fiss, 1999). 
Performance in the current study may also be influenced by individuals’ abilities to 
inhibit irrelevant information.  Specifically, irrelevant thoughts that occur due to mind wandering 
or other distractions may tap into the pool of limited attentional resources (e.g., Christoff, 
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Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006).   In comparison, 
they may result from a failure to control attention and maintain focus on the relevant task 
(McVay & Kane, 2010).  Thus, participants who are better able to ignore thoughts not related to 
the task set were expected to show better prospective performance and LDT performance.  The 
Stroop task requires participants to respond to the printed color of items (e.g., the color blue) 
while trying to ignore what is written (e.g., the word red).  The written information is irrelevant, 
but difficult to ignore because reading is the more common and stronger process (e.g., Friedman 
& Miyake, 2004; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000; MacCleod, 1991).  As 
such, the Stroop task was included as a valid and reliable measure of inhibition (Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004; Miyake et al., 2000).  The relationship with Stroop performance was expected to 
be borne out in PM accuracy, LDT response latencies and eye movement measures.  Participants 
who experienced greater difficulty inhibiting distracting thoughts were expected to display 
poorer PM performance, longer response latencies in the LDT, and it was presumed that these 
participants would make longer and possibly more fixations per trial.  Furthermore, this 
relationship was expected to be indicative of monitoring and should be stronger, in the PM 
groups.  Research also suggests that individuals higher in working memory capacity are better 
able to ignore irrelevant information (Kane & Engle, 2003).  Thus, Ospan performance was 
expected to correlate with Stroop performance and eye movement measures predicted to indicate 
off-task thoughts.   
Although participants were given instructions to reduce the influence of task set 
perceptions, it was unclear whether such instructions would eliminate their influence.  After 
participants completed the performance block of the LDT they completed a brief post-
experiment questionnaire to directly evaluate their subjective experiences.  In particular, the 
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post-experiment questionnaire evaluated participants’ perceptions of difficulty and importance of 
the LDT and PM tasks.  PM participants who judged the task set as more difficult were expected 
to be more likely to engage in monitoring processes.  Similarly, those who placed importance on 
the PM task were expected to monitor and as a result, display better PM performance.   
5.2 Multiprocess View Predictions 
According to the multiprocess view, the distinctiveness of the PM cue and prior 
experience with this change in the baseline block should automatically set in motion retrieval 
processes concerning the relevance of the cue when it appears.  This was expected to come about 
regardless of whether participants anticipated the cue or not (e.g., Einstein et al., 2005; McDaniel 
& Einstein, 2007).  As a result, PM performance was expected to be very high and evidence of 
monitoring was not predicted to be found in the current study.  Therefore, emphasizing the 
importance of one task over the other was not predicted to affect PM performance.  Consistent 
with these predictions, Einstein et al. (2005) found that emphasizing the PM task did not benefit 
performance when the PM task did not require monitoring. 
The response latency results and eye movement results were predicted to be similar for 
all of the groups in both blocks of the task with the exception of the PM emphasis group.  
Because emphasizing the PM task promotes monitoring, this group alone may show costs to the 
ongoing task.  In their Experiment 1, Einstein et al. (2005) tested performance under conditions 
where monitoring was not theoretically needed to complete the PM task.  The authors found no 
significant differences between a moderate PM emphasis condition and the no intention control 
condition; however, responding was significantly longer when high importance was placed on 
the PM task.  Therefore, latencies in the control and ongoing emphasis groups were anticipated 
to be similar, but like Einstein et al. (2005), latencies yielded by the PM emphasis were expected 
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to be longer than the control and ongoing emphasis conditions.  One caveat to these predictions 
is that experiencing the PM cue color change during the baseline block may mitigate the effect of 
the emphasis instructions.  If this is the case, then all of the PM groups should show ongoing 
performance comparable to that of the control group’s performance.  The predictions regarding 
the eye movement results were similar to the response latency predictions: All of the groups 
were expected to show similar eye movement results with the possibility that the PM emphasis 
group’s results may diverge.    
Stroop and Ospan performance were not predicted to correlate with PM performance 
because the current PM task theoretically did not require attentional resources beyond those 
needed to complete the ongoing task.  However, Stroop and Ospan performance were expected 
to correlate with each other because they measure related cognitive processes (Kane & Engle, 
2003).  Similarly, post-experiment reports of difficulty and importance should not predict PM 
performance because the distinctness of the cue was expected to overpower the influence of 
participant perceptions of the task set.  Even if participants did not appreciate the salience of the 
PM cue, the cue should still capture attention and assure the completion of the intention.  In 
contrast, there may be some evidence of monitoring if participants whose post-experiment results 
indicate they placed high importance on the PM task, resulting in an unnecessary allocation of 
attention to the PM task.  In the unlikely event that it occurs, any evidence of monitoring should 
correlate with Ospan performance, Stroop performance, task set difficulty and importance of the 
PM task.  Note that in contrast to the predictions made by Preparatory Attention and Memory 
Processes Theory, monitoring processes were not expected to be related to PM performance. 




Chapter 6 Experiment 
6.1    Method 
6.1.1    Participants 
 Participants were drawn from the Department of Psychology’s subject pool at Louisiana 
State University and were awarded partial course credit or extra credit for their participation.  
Two hundred eleven students participated in either a behavioral only version or an eye tracking 
version of the experiment.  The behavioral only version was included to remain consistent with 
the methods that are traditionally used in PM studies.  The stimuli in the eye tracking version 
were presented in the same manner as the behavioral only version, but responses were recorded 
using a controller instead of the keyboard.  The behavioral only version was included to ensure 
that the response latency results obtained from the eye tracking version were not simply an 
artifact of the response mechanism.  Of the 211 participants, 149 (control n = 37, ongoing 
emphasis n = 38, no emphasis n = 38, PM emphasis n = 36) completed a behavioral only version 
of the tasks where eye movement methods were not included.  The remaining 62 students 
(control n = 17, ongoing emphasis n = 15, no emphasis n = 15, PM emphasis n = 15) participated 
in the eye tracking version of the experiment where eye movements were recorded during the 
baseline and performance LDT tasks. 
6.1.2    Design and Materials 
6.1.2.1    Ongoing Task 
 The ongoing task was an LDT.  A pool of 138 medium frequency words was selected 
from the Kučera Francis (1967) word compendium to be used in the LDT.  Each word in the 
LDT had a nonword counterpart.  Procedures implemented by Smith and colleagues were used to 
create pronounceable nonwords by moving the first syllable of each word to the end of the word 
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(Smith 2003; Smith et al., 2007).  Words that appeared when the box color changed did not have 
a nonword counterpart, resulting in a total of 272 stimuli.  Each LDT stimulus was presented in 
either the bottom or top third of the screen and was centered horizontally.  Each item appeared in 
black Courier New 18 point font on a gray background.  The background display was composed 
of nine grids.  Participants in the behavioral only version made their LDT responses using a 
computer keyboard.  Participants who participated in the eye movement version responded using 
an EyeLink button controller which is similar to a video game controller.  All items were 
counterbalanced across participants.  The order of presentation was randomized anew for each 
participant. 
6.1.2.2    PM task  
 After the baseline block, participants in the PM groups were given the PM instructions to 
respond anytime the box opposite the LDT stimulus changed colors.  Therefore, the color 
change/PM cue appeared in either the top or bottom third of the screen and was centered 
horizontally.  Each box created by the grid background subtended 8.17 of visual angle.  On 
color change/PM trials the entire box opposite the LDT stimulus changed green once and yellow 
once at baseline.  The box changed red once and blue once in the performance block.  Different 
colors were used on the change trials to account for potential differences in saliency of the 
change from one color to the next and thus, differences in detecting the change itself.  There 
were no differences in participants’ abilities to detect the changes as evidenced by the response 
latency results, eye movement results, and explicit reports from the post-experiment 
questionnaire.  The reported results were collapsed across this factor.  On non-change trials the 
box was gray like the rest of the background.  The color changes subtended such a large area 
(about one ninth of the entire screen) to ensure that the change was distinct and could be detected 
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without looking directly at the change area to discourage monitoring.  The color box changed 
back to gray on the trial following the change. 
6.1.2.3    Eye Movement Data Collection 
 The eye movement data were collected using an EyeLink II eye tracker.  Eye movements 
were recorded at a rate of 500 Hz from a single eye with an accuracy of 0.5°.  The EyeLink II 
cameras were calibrated before the baseline and performance blocks.  Following the calibration 
tasks the computer selected the eye with the least amount of error to track throughout the task.  
Eye position data were recorded every 3.0 msec.  Information about the specifications of the 
EyeLink II can be found at http://www.sr-research.com/EL_II.html.  
6.1.2.4    Predictor Measures  
 The Operation Span (Ospan) task is a measure of working memory capacity that has a 
processing component and a memory storage component.  Ospan is thought to be a valid 
measure of how much information an individual can store in a short term memory store, or 
working memory capacity, because the processing component prevents the use of strategies such 
as rehearsal (e.g., Conway, Kane, Bunting, Hambrick, Wilhelm, & Engle, 2005).  For this 
reason, the Ospan task was included as a measure of working memory capacity.  In this task 
participants were required to determine whether simple mathematical statements (e.g., 2 + 5 = 7) 
were true or false.  Half of the statements were true and the order of true and false statements 
was random.  Following each problem, participants were shown a letter they were to remember.  
Participants were presented with 3 to 7 math problem/letter displays per trial.  At the end of each 
trial, participants were shown a display with a series of 12 letters.  They were required to indicate 
in serial order which letters were presented during that trial.  Participants performed a practice 
block of 22 trials followed by 15 experimental trials (3 trials at each length: 3 to 7).  Participants 
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performed the math problems at their own pace; however, if they took longer than their average 
response time during the practice phase, the trial was counted as an error.  
 The ability to control attention by inhibiting irrelevant information was measured using a 
computerized version of the Stroop task.  In this task, participants were given three different trial 
types.  In one type they were shown color words that were presented in a different color creating 
incongruent trials (e.g., GREEN presented in blue color).  On other trials they were shown an 
asterisk that presented in one of six colors (red, green, blue, orange, yellow, or purple).  Finally, 
the last trial type consisted of neutral words presented in one of the six colors.  Participants were 
required to state out loud the color of each stimulus as quickly and accurately as possible.  Each 
trial began with a white fixation point on a black screen presented for 500 ms, followed by 
presentation of the trial stimulus (color word, asterisk, or neutral word).  The stimuli remained on 
the screen until the participant made a response.  After a response was given, the screen 
remained black for 1000 ms before the beginning of the next trial.  There were 60 asterisk trials, 
60 color word trials, and 60 neutral word trials, with the different trial types mixed throughout 
the task.  The order of trials was pseudorandom, such that the color on one trial was not related 
to the word or the color on the trial that immediately precedes it.  The trials were also fixed such 
that no single trial type (e.g., asterisk) appeared more than three trials in a row.  To facilitate 
selection process with such few possible selections because of the randomization criteria, the 
program was written such that it created 90 trials that met the criteria and then repeated the 
sequence once.  A similar design was previously used and shown to measure individual 
differences in the ability to ignore distracting information (Friedman & Miyake, 2004).   
 Participants completed a brief demographics questionnaire on the computer to screen for 
colorblindness and other known visual impairments.  The demographics questionnaire also 
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recorded responses to other variables that may have influenced performance such as the number 
of medications the participants were taking and how much caffeine was consumed before 
entering the experiment session.  The final task in the experiment was the paper and pencil post-
experiment questionnaire designed to assess participants’ perceptions of the task set.  Please refer 
to Appendix B for a list of the statements included in the demographics questionnaire and refer 
to Appendix C for a list of the statements included in the post-experiment questionnaire. 
6.1.3    Procedure 
 When participants entered the experiment they first completed the computer based 
demographics questionnaire, which took about three minutes.  Only participants with normal to 
corrected vision participated in the study.  Colorblind participants were permitted to participate 
but their Stroop results were not included in the data.  Immediately following the demographics 
questionnaire, participants performed the Ospan task followed by the baseline block of the LDT, 
the Stroop task, performance block of the LDT, and finally the post-experiment questionnaire. 
Following the Ospan task, participants received instructions for the LDT.  They were told 
to decide as quickly as possible whether each letter string created a valid English word or a 
nonword.  Participants in the eye tracking version of the study responded to words by pressing 
the right trigger button on the EyeLink controller with their right index finger and pressing the 
left trigger button with their left index finger to indicate the current stimulus was a nonword.  
Participants in the behavioral version responded to by pressing the “F” or “J” keys on the 
keyboard respectively marked “NW” for nonword and “W” for word with either their left or 
right index fingers.  Participants in both versions of the task were told to keep their index fingers 
poised over the nonword and word response keys.  Each trial in the eye tracking version began 
with a drift correction that lasted about 250 ms, followed by a 500 ms fixation display.  The drift 
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correction accounts for errors between what the EyeLink II recorded and actual eye movements 
and fixations.  During the drift correction, participants looked at the center of a target on the 
screen and pressed the large round button on the EyeLink controller so the EyeLink II could 
calculate x-y coordinates corresponding to the location of the pupil.  The fixation display 
appeared as soon as the EyeLink II registered a recording.  An asterisk appeared on the fixation 
display in the same location as the drift correction target.  This was also the same location at 
which each LDT stimulus appeared.  The fixation display served to keep participants focused in 
the location of the LDT and as a brief filler display because the EyeLink II did not record eye 
movement data for about 500 ms following a drift correction.  In the behavioral version, there 
was no need for a drift correction so the fixation display appeared for 750 ms to try to equate the 
time between the start of the trial and presentation of the LDT stimulus.  The LDT stimuli 
appeared as soon as the fixation display disappeared in both versions of the task.  The LDT 
stimuli remained on the screen until participants made a response. Once a response was given a 
screen with the word “NEXT” automatically appeared.  Participants in the eye tracking version 
were required to press the large round button on the EyeLink II controller with their left thumb 
when the word “NEXT” appeared to end each trial.  In the behavioral version, participants 
pressed the spacebar when the word “NEXT” appeared.  Each of the trial stimuli, drift correction 
target, fixation asterisk, LDT stimulus and “NEXT”, appeared in the same location.  Figure 2 
shows an example of a full LDT trial when there is no color change. 
The color box changed colors on trials 41 and 82 in the baseline block upon presentation 
of the LDT slide (refer to Figure 3).  On change trials the entire box opposite the LDT stimulus 
changed colors (refer to Figure 1).  The color change remained on the screen through the 
presentation of the “NEXT” slide.  The color box changed back to gray upon presentation of the 
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drift correction that began the following trial.  Participants were not made aware of the of the 
color changes prior to the outset of the baseline block.  To obtain an adequate measure of LDT 
performance participants completed 102 baseline trials. 
 
Figure 2  
Lexical Decision Trial Schematic.  The drift correction only appears in the eye tracking version 
of the study. 
 
At the end of the baseline block the participants were informed that the experimenters 
were concerned with their ability to perform different cognitive tasks.  At this point the PM 
groups were given instructions to respond to the PM color change cue.  The control group was 
made aware of the changes, but they were instructed to ignore them (Refer to Appendix D).  
After receiving the performance block instructions each participant engaged in 12 practice LDT 
trials where the color change/PM cue appeared three times to familiarize participants with the 
PM response or making LDT responses in the face of color changes. 
43 
 
 After the practice trials participants engaged in the Stroop task.  The Stroop task not only 
served as a measure of inhibition, but it also served to prevent the intention from remaining in 
working memory when participants began the performance block.  It is typical to include another 
task at this point to help avoid ceiling effects (e.g., Brandimonte & Passolungi, 1994; Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1990). 
Participants began the performance block of the LDT following the presentation of the 
Stroop task.  They were reminded which keys (or triggers) corresponded to their word/nonword 
decisions and of their “NEXT” response, but they were not reminded about the color changes or 
their significance.  The methods were the same as the baseline block with the exception of the 
total number of trials, the trials where the changes occurred, and the colors that appeared.  In the 
performance block there were 170 LDT trials, the change trials/PM cue appeared on trials 75 and 
150, and the box changed to red and blue.  Following the performance block, participants 
completed the post-experiment questionnaire and then were debriefed and thanked for their 
participation.  
6.2    Behavioral Results and Analyses 
The Type I error rate for each of the reported analyses was set at  = .05.  One participant 
each from the ongoing and no emphasis groups was dropped from the behavioral only condition 
because they were missing performance block data due to an experimenter error. One participant 
was dropped from the control group in the eye tracking condition due to an issue that occurred 






6.2.1    LDT Accuracy 
 Accuracy in the LDT was calculated as a percent correct score for word trials.  This 
measure did not include the two color change or PM trials.  One participant in the PM emphasis 
group from the behavioral only condition was excluded because his or her accuracy results were 
two standard deviations below the group’s mean.  In the eye tracking condition, one participant 
in each of the PM groups and two participants in the control group were not included in the 
analyses because their accuracy results were below two standard deviations of their group’s 
mean.  Table 2 shows the accuracy data from the baseline and performance blocks for the 
behavioral only and eye tracking conditions.  Separate 4  2 mixed factorial Analyses of 
Variance (ANOVA) were performed on the behavioral only condition accuracy results and the 
eye tracking condition accuracy results.  Group (control, ongoing emphasis, no emphasis, PM 
emphasis) served as the between-subjects variable and block (baseline, performance) served as 
the within-subjects variable.  The behavioral only condition results yielded a main effect of block 
F(1, 142) = 61.96, p < .01, p2 = .30.  There was no effect of group F(3, 142) = 1.16, p > .05, p2 
= .02, nor was there an interaction between block and group F(3, 142) = 1.54, p > .05, p2 = .03.  
The eye tracking condition accuracy results were similar to those of the behavioral only 
condition.  There was a main effect of block F(1, 52) = 27.20, p < .01, p2 = .34, no effect of 
group F(3, 52) = 1.83, p = .15, p2 = .10, but the interaction was significant F(3, 52) = 3.42, p = 
.02, p2 = .17.  The outcome of simple effects tests using a Bonferroni correction showed that 
LDT accuracy declined in the performance block for all of the groups except the no emphasis 
group.  The results from both conditions suggest that accuracy declined slightly in the 
performance block; however accuracy was not affected by the PM instructions.  These results are 
not surprising because making lexical decisions at one’s own pace is a fairly easy task.  Thus, 
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LDT accuracy is not likely to be sensitive enough to detect any influence from the PM task.  For 
this reason, no further accuracy analyses will be discussed.  
Table 2 




Behavioral Only Condition 
Control (n = 37) .99 (.003) .97 (.003) 
Ongoing Emphasis (n = 37) .99 (.003) .96 (.005) 
No Emphasis (n = 37) .98 (.003) .97 (.004) 
PM Emphasis (n = 35) .99 (.002) .97 (.006) 
Eye Tracking Condition 
Control (n = 14) 1.00 ( – ) .99 (.002) 
Ongoing Emphasis (n = 14) .99 (.003) .98 (.006) 
No Emphasis (n = 14) .99 (.005) .99 (.004) 
PM Emphasis (n = 14) ~1.00 (.002) .98 (.006) 
 
6.2.2    Response Latencies in the LDT 
 The response latency measures from the LDT were expected to be sensitive enough to 
detect the influence of the PM instructions, if there were any to detect.  The first response latency 
measure compared the average median latencies from the baseline and performance blocks.  
Latencies in the baseline block were taken from the end of the block and included the trials 
following the second color change.  This interval was used to ensure that participants had ample 
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the task.  The interval preceding the appearance of the 
first color change/PM cue in the performance block was expected to provide the best opportunity 
to discover evidence of monitoring.  Once participants have had the opportunity to complete the 
intention, there may no longer be a need to devote resources to this task.  Hence, evidence of 
monitoring is not likely to be found once the cue has been presented.  The second set of response 
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latencies compared performance on the single trial preceding the change, the trial where the 
change/PM cue occurred, and the trial following the change.  These variables were examined to 
determine whether the color change captured attention and whether its effects lasted beyond the 
change trial.  The response latency measures were analyzed separately for the behavioral only 
and eye tracking conditions and only included trials where a correct response was given. 
6.2.2.1    Behavioral Only Condition 
 Average median response latencies (ms) to correct word trials were submitted to a 2  4 
mixed factorial ANOVA with block (baseline interval 3, performance interval 1) as the within-
subjects variable and group (control, ongoing emphasis, no emphasis, PM emphasis) as the 
between-subjects variable.  Four outliers were removed from the control (n = 33) and no 
emphasis groups (n = 33), two were dropped from the ongoing emphasis group (n = 35) and one 
participant was dropped from the PM emphasis group (n = 35) because their latencies exceeded 
two standard deviations from their group’s mean.  There was a main effect of block F(1, 132) = 
8.69, p < .01, p2 = .06, no main effect of group F(3, 132) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .02, and no 
interaction between block and group F(3, 132) = 2.30, p > .05, p2 = .05.  The main effect of 
block was a result of significantly faster response latencies during the performance interval 
compared to the baseline interval.   
 Although there was not a significant main effect of group, the PM groups displayed 
similar latencies during the performance block while the control was numerically faster.  The 
control group’s performance block results were faster both in comparison to the PM groups and 
to their baseline latencies.  Separate one-way ANOVAs on the baseline and performance 
intervals did not yield any significant group effects, nor did a comparison of the difference 
scores.  An Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on performance interval 
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latencies with baseline interval latencies as the covariate in an attempt to account for the 
influence of baseline responding at performance.  The results showed that baseline latencies were 
significantly related to performance block latencies F(1, 135) = 143.93, p < .01, p2 = .52.  The 
effect of group during the performance interval did reach significance F(3, 135) = 4.40, p = .01, 
p2 = .09.  Post-hoc comparisons on the estimated adjusted means for the performance interval 
using a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons revealed significant differences between 
the control and the ongoing emphasis groups and the control and the PM emphasis groups at p < 
.05, no other differences were significant.  Thus, when the error variance is reduced by 
accounting for baseline performance the group differences were significant.  The results of the 
ANCOVA suggest that the ongoing emphasis and PM emphasis groups engaged monitoring 
processes during the performance block, preventing them from improving to the same degree as 
the control group. 
Table 3  
Behavioral Only Condition LDT Response Latencies.  The values are the average median 
response latencies (ms) to correct word trials during the third baseline interval and the first 
performance interval.  The performance interval 1 estimated adjusted means from the ANCOVA 
were evaluated at baseline interval 3 = 635 ms.  Values in parentheses represent one standard 
error of the mean. 
 















Control (n = 33) 627 (15) 588 (11) 592 (9) 39 (11) 
Ongoing Emphasis (n = 35) 632 (17) 631 (13) 632 (9) 1 (12) 
No Emphasis (n = 33) 648 (21) 624 (15) 617 (9) 23 (13) 





 There is research from both laboratory settings and naturalistic environments suggesting 
that people sometimes use down time between tasks to remind themselves of uncompleted 
intentions (e.g., Hicks, Marsh, & Russell, 2000; Martin, Brown, & Hicks, 2011; Sellen, Louie, 
Harris, & Wilkins, 1997).  In the current study, it was possible that participants viewed the 
“Next” response as downtime because the “Next” slide only served to tell participants to end the 
current trial and prepare for the following trial.  As such, “Next” latencies were compared across 
the third baseline and first performance intervals.  All of the comparisons failed to reach 
significance and the results will not be discussed further.  There was no indication that 
participants used the “Next” response as time to reflect on the PM task or other thoughts 
(responses during both intervals were close to 200 ms).  
The final response latency comparisons were made between the trials preceding the color 
change, the change trials and the trials immediately following the change.  These trials were 
selected to compare performance during the brief window adjacent the change.  The data only 
include participants who made correct LDT judgments on all three trial types.  As a result, the 
number of participants included in the baseline block comparisons were slightly different from 
the previous latency comparisons, control n = 36, ongoing emphasis n = 37, no emphasis n = 33, 
PM emphasis n = 34.  The change trial in the baseline block was unexpected, but the pre-change 
and post-change trials were similar to the other LDT trials. 
Baseline latencies on the pre-change trial were very similar: all of the groups slowed 
when the change occurred and participants sped up on the post-change trial.  This was confirmed 
by a 3 (trial type)  4 (group) mixed factorial ANOVA with trial type as the within-subjects 
factor and group as the between-subjects factor.  There was a significant effect of trial type F(2, 
272) = 59.24, p < .01, p2 = .30, a significant effect of group F(3, 136) = 2.68, p = .05, p2 = .06, 
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and no interaction F(6, 272) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .01.  Follow-up post-hoc tests were conducted 
using a Bonferroni correction.  The results showed that the change trial was significantly slower 
than the pre-change and post-change trials (both significant at p < .01), and the pre-change trial 
was significantly faster than the post-change trial (p < .01).  The post-hoc tests on the main effect 
of group suggest it was driven by differences between the no emphasis group and the control 
group (p = .09) and the no emphasis group and the PM emphasis group (p = .11), although the 
differences were not significant after being adjusted for multiple comparisons.  The results 
demonstrate that participants performed similarly on the pre-change, change, and post-change 
trials at baseline.  Importantly, everyone slowed significantly on the change trials suggesting 
they captured attention (refer to Figure 3). 
Behavioral Only Condition Baseline Pre-change, Change, and Post-change Latencies 
 
Figure 3  
Behavioral Only Condition Baseline Pre-change, Change, and Post-change Latencies.  Values 
are the average response latencies (ms) from the two pre-change, change, and post-change trials 
during the baseline block from the behavioral only condition.  Error bars represent one standard 

































The same analyses were conducted for the performance block pre-change, change, and 
post-change trials.  The data are shown in Figure 5.  In contrast to the baseline block, participants 
were aware of the color changes that occurred during the performance block.  Additionally, this 
change served as the cue for the PM groups to press the space bar after making their lexical 
judgments.  As with the baseline block, the comparisons only included participants who made 
correct LDT judgments on all three trial types.  Thus, the results exclude participants who made 
their PM responses early on the change trial (i.e., before making a lexical decision).  The number 
of participants in each group were control n = 32, ongoing emphasis n = 28, no emphasis n = 33, 
and PM emphasis n = 33. 
The performance results were similar to those obtained at baseline with the exception of 
the change trial.  The 3 (trial type)  4 (group) mixed factorial ANOVA yielded a significant 
effect of trial F(2, 244) = 106.80, p < .01, p2 = .47, and a significant effect of group F(3, 122) = 
9.70, p < .01, p2 = 19.  The main effect of trial arose because the pre-change latencies were 
significantly faster than both the change/PM trial and post-change latencies (both comparisons 
significant at p < .01).  The change trial was also significantly slower than the post-change trial 
(p < .01).  Although the main effect of group was significant at baseline, the effect size for the 
performance block results was triple the effect size produced at baseline.  This finding was borne 
out in the post-hoc analysis results where the control group displayed significantly faster 
latencies overall than the ongoing emphasis, no emphasis, and PM emphasis groups (all 
comparisons, p < .01).  In contrast to the baseline results, the main effects were qualified by a 





Behavioral Only Condition Performance Pre-change, Change, and Post-change Latencies 
 
Figure 4  
Behavioral Only Condition Performance Pre-change, Change and Post-change Latencies. Values 
are the average response latencies (ms) from the two pre-change, change, and post-change trials 
during the performance block from the behavioral only condition.  Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean. 
 
It is clear from the data in Figure 4 that the interaction was driven by the fact that the 
control group did not slow down on the change trial to the degree that the PM groups slowed on 
this trial.  This supports the idea that the PM cue was detected and participants likely engaged in 
retrieval processes related to the intention (e.g., what response to make, when to make it, etc.).  
This slowing occurred when participants made their lexical decisions prior to making the PM 
response.  Thus, it shows the slowing was not simply a result of the PM groups making the PM 
response while the control group made lexical decisions.  Although there still seems to be some 
small degree of carry-over from the change/PM trial for the PM groups, all of the groups are 
strikingly similar on the pre-change trial.  This snap-shot analysis suggests that participants were 
not engaged in monitoring processes on the pre-change trial.  However, this single trial analysis 
may have captured a point where monitoring has waned, if it previously occurred.  Importantly, 
































in that there doesn’t seem to be an influence of the intention just before the cue appeared, but the 
cue captured the attention of the PM participants as soon as it did appear.  Furthermore, the pre-
change latencies do not seem to reflect a trade-off between accuracy, as it was similar across the 
groups. 
6.2.2.2    Eye Tracking Condition  
The same set of latency analyses were calculated for the eye tracking condition.  
Response latencies at the end of the baseline block were compared to the response latencies from 
the beginning of the performance block to determine whether the PM task had an effect on LDT 
performance.  One participant from each group was dropped due to outlier performance.  There 
were no differences from baseline to performance F(1, 53) = 2.18, p = .15, p2 = .04, no group 
differences F(3, 53) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .03, and the interaction was not significant F(3, 53) = 
1.75, p = .17, p2 = .09.  
Table 4  
Eye Tracking Condition LDT Response Latencies. Values are the average median response 
latencies (ms) to correct word trials during third baseline interval and the first performance 
interval.  The performance interval 1 estimated adjusted means from the ANCOVA were 
evaluated at baseline interval 3 = 660 ms.  Values in parentheses represent one standard error of 
the mean. 
 













Control (n = 15) 645 (23) 632 (26) 640 (16) 13 (18) 
Ongoing Emphasis (n = 14) 687 (35) 661 (28) 646 (17) 27 (25) 
No Emphasis (n = 14) 645 (20) 667 (21) 675 (17) -22 (14) 





The performance latencies from the first interval were also submitted to an ANCOVA 
with response latencies during the third baseline interval as the covariate as an attempt to reduce 
the error variance within each group.  Baseline latencies were significantly related to 
performance latencies F(1, 52) = 47.49, p < .01, p2 = .48, but the results of the ANCOVA still 
yielded null effects of group F(3, 52) = 2.23, p = .10, p2 = .11.  Thus, individuals who were 
slower at baseline tended to be slower at performance.  Importantly, performance latencies were 
not affected by the control and PM instructions given at the end of the baseline block, even when 
the error variance was greatly reduced by accounting for the covariate.  The ANCOVA results 
were replicated when comparing the difference between the third interval baseline and actual 
first interval performance results.  Overall, the PM groups and control group showed similar 
performance.  However, the no emphasis group slowed in the performance block where the other 
groups were all faster.  Although the no emphasis group’s results may indicate initial evidence of 
monitoring, the PM emphasis group showed no evidence.  In fact, the PM emphasis group 
showed the greatest improvement.  This is in contrast to the predictions made by both 
Preparatory Attention Theory, and the Multiprocess View that this group should show the 
greatest degree of monitoring or at least be most likely to employ such resources. 
 The “Next” response latencies from correct word trials during baseline interval 3 and 
performance interval 1 were submitted to a 2 (block)  4 (group) mixed factorial ANOVA to 
determine whether monitoring was likely to occur at a point when participants were not directly 
engaged in the LDT.  Unlike the behavioral only condition, the performance block was 
significantly faster than the baseline block F(1, 50) = 12.92, p < .01, p2 = .21, and the effect of 
group was significant, F(3, 50) = 3.23, p = .03, p2 = 16.  The main effect of group was a result 
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of slower responding by the no emphasis group compared to the ongoing emphasis group (p = 
.05).  Notably, the interaction was not significant, F(3, 50) = 2.16, p = .11, p2 = .11.   
The performance block results were submitted to an ANCOVA with baseline “Next” 
latencies as the covariate.  The ANCOVA results showed that baseline latencies were 
significantly related to performance latencies F(1, 49) = 26.71, p < .01,p2 = .35 and the effect 
of group went away F(3, 49) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .05.  The results suggest the main effect of 
group that resulted from the ANOVA was driven by slower latencies in the no emphasis 
condition during both blocks of the task, and that these differences were not meaningful.  
Furthermore, if the differences were indicative of monitoring processes, they should have arisen 
between the control group and the PM groups, and not necessarily between the PM groups 
themselves.  The “Next” response latencies were slower overall in the eye tracking condition 
(about 500 ms in both blocks) compared to the behavioral only condition (about 200 ms in both 
blocks); however, the results did not suggest that these responses were affected by monitoring 
processes. 
Finally, response latency comparisons were conducted for the pre-change, change, and 
post-change trials.  As with the behavioral only condition, only participants who made correct 
LDT responses on all trial types were included in the following analyses.  This requirement 
excluded participants who made their PM response early.  The number of participants included 
in the baseline block comparisons were control n =16, ongoing emphasis n =15, no emphasis n 
=14, and PM emphasis n =14.  The number of participants included in the performance block 




Eye Tracking Condition Baseline Pre-change, Change, and Post-change Latencies 
 
Figure 5  
Eye Tracking Condition Baseline Pre-change, Change, and Post-change Latencies. Values are 
the average response latencies (ms) from the two pre-change, change, and post-change trials 
during the baseline block from the eye tracking condition.  Error bars represent one standard 
error of the mean. 
 
Baseline data are displayed in Figure 5.  The pattern of results replicated those of the 
behavioral only condition.  Pre-change latencies were very similar for all of the groups, everyone 
slowed when the change occurred, and participants tended to speed back up following the 
change, although some slowing still occurred.  These results were confirmed by a 3 (trial type)  
4 (group) mixed factorial ANOVA.  There was a significant effect of trial type F(2, 110) = 
36.34, p < .00, p2 = .40, no effect of group F(3, 55) = 1.18, p > .05, p2 = .06, and the 
interaction failed to reach significance F(6, 110) = 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .05.  Follow-up post-hoc 
tests were conducted using a Bonferroni correction.  The results showed that the change trial was 
significantly slower than the pre-change and post-change trials (both significant at p < .01), and 
the pre-change trial was significantly faster than the post-change trial (p = .01).  The results 
demonstrate that the groups performed similarly at baseline.  Comparable to the behavioral only 
































Eye Tracking Condition Performance Pre-change, Change, and Post-change Latencies 
 
Figure 6  
Eye Tracking Condition Performance Pre-change, Change, and Post-change Latencies.  Values 
are the average response latencies (ms) from the two pre-change, change, and post-change trials 
during the performance block from the eye tracking condition.  Error bars represent one standard 
error of the mean. 
 
The pre-change, change/PM, and post-change latency data from the performance block 
are displayed in Figure 6 and replicate those produced by the behavioral only group.  There was 
a main effect of trial type F(2, 102) = 41.25, p < .01, p2 = .45, a main effect of group F(3, 51) = 
3.53, p = .02, p2 = .17, and the results were qualified by a significant interaction F(6, 102) = 
3.73, p < .01, p2 = .18.  The change/PM trial was significantly slower than the pre-change and 
post-change trials, but the pre-change trial did not differ from the post-change trial (all 
comparisons evaluated at  = .05).  Unlike the behavioral only condition, there were not any 
carryover effects in the performance block.  Importantly, only participants in the PM groups 
slowed when the change occurred, even though this was not the exact moment when they were to 
make the PM response.  Notably, the results replicate the behavioral only condition showing 
































responded just as quickly as the control group on the pre-change trial and slowed significantly 
when the cue appeared.  LDT latencies on the pre-change trial do not reflect a speed-accuracy 
trade-off as all of the groups showed similar levels of accuracy on all three trial types.  
Altogether the pre-change, change, and post-change results do not suggest that the PM task 
negatively influenced LDT performance. 
6.2.3    Prospective Memory Performance 
 Prospective memory performance was calculated as the proportion of participants who 
responded at least once to the PM cues because PM performance within each condition was 
about equal across the PM groups on both PM trials (proportion correct values: behavioral only 
condition PM 1 = .65, PM 2 = .66; eye tracking condition PM 1 = .71, PM 2 = .78).  PM 
performance results include participants who made their PM responses early (i.e., they made 
their PM response instead of their lexical decision on the change trial), and those who made late 
responses (made a PM response on the trial that immediately followed the change).  In the 
behavioral only condition, there were two participants in each of the ongoing and PM emphasis 
groups that responded early on the first PM trial.  There were also two ongoing emphasis 
participants who responded late on the first PM trial.  On the second PM trial one participant in 
the PM emphasis group responded early and no one responded late.  In the eye tracking 
condition there was one participant in the ongoing emphasis condition who responded early on 
both PM trials, a single participant in the no emphasis condition who responded early on the first 
PM trial, and two PM emphasis participants who responded early on both PM trials.  There were 
not any participants in the eye tracking condition who made a late PM response.  The PM 





Prospective Memory Performance. Values in parentheses represent one standard error of the 
mean. 
 
 Prospective Memory Performance 
 Behavioral Only Condition Eye Tracking Condition 
Ongoing Emphasis .68 (.08) .80 (.13) 
No Emphasis .78 (.07) .80 (.11) 
PM Emphasis .69 (.08) .80 (.11) 
 
 One-way ANOVAs were conducted on PM performance for each experimental condition.  
The emphasis instructions did not influence prospective memory performance in either 
condition: behavioral only F(2, 110) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .01, eye tracking F(2, 42) < 1.00, p > 
.05, p2 = .00.  One-tailed bivariate correlations were run to examine the relationship between 
speed of processing before and during the PM trial and PM performance.   Any significant 
correlations were expected to be positive, showing that slower processing was related to an 
increase in PM performance.  The reported latencies only include trials where correct lexical 
decisions were made.  The correlations were nearly identical when incorrect responses were 
included, but the correlations from correct trials are reported to remain consistent with the 
previous analyses.  
In the behavioral only condition, PM performance was not correlated with response 
latencies on the pre-change trial (r = .14, p = .09), nor was it correlated with the average response 
latencies before the first change (r = .13, p = .09).  However, PM performance was correlated 
with speed of processing on the change trial.  Participants who made slower lexical judgments on 
the PM trials were more likely to complete the intention (r = .49, p < .01).  Likewise, participants 
who made slower responses on the “Next” slide of the PM trials (the moment when the PM 
response was to be made) were more likely to complete the intention (r = .52, p < .01).   
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 In the eye tracking condition, PM performance was not correlated with response latencies 
on the pre-change trial (r = -.18, p = .11), nor was it correlated with the average response 
latencies before the appearance of the first PM cue (r = -.06, p = .35).   In fact, both relationships 
were in the opposite direction of what was expected.  Comparable to the behavioral only 
condition, PM performance was correlated with processing on the change trial.  Those who made 
slower lexical decisions (r = .31, p = .03) and who made slower responses on the “Next” slide (r 
= .38, p = .01) were more likely to complete the intention. 
 Conclusions drawn from the bivariate correlations show that speed of processing before 
the PM cue appeared was not related to PM performance, but speed of processing on the PM trial 
was strongly related to PM performance.  The correlation results also support the claim that 
when the PM cue captured attention participants in the PM groups slowed to engage retrieval 
processes related to the intention. 
6.3 Eye Movement Results and Analyses 
 Similar to the response latency data, eye movement data from correct word LDT trials 
following the second color change at baseline and before the first color change during 
performance were analyzed because they were expected to be best suited for detecting 
monitoring processes.  To determine if the PM instructions influenced participants’ lexical 
decisions the average amount of time spent looking at the LDT stimulus was calculated as well 
as the number of fixations that were made on the LDT stimulus before making a decision.  These 
measures can be considered to be more precise than the response latency measures because they 
exclude fixations away from the LDT stimulus and potentially thoughts not related to the task 
set.  Two participants, one from the ongoing emphasis and one from the PM emphasis groups, 
were dropped from the duration analyses due to significantly longer fixation durations.  
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Likewise, one control participant was dropped from the analyses on the number of fixations.  In 
addition, one participant in the control group and one participant in the no emphasis group were 
dropped from the eye movement analyses because their data were not recorded during the 
performance block.  The duration data are reported in Table 6 and are slightly longer than the 
response latency data because there were instances where the last fixation on the fixation slide 
spilled over onto the LDT slide.  However, the observed increase was similar for each group, 
both during the baseline and performance blocks. 
Table 6 
Fixation Durations on the LDT.  Values are the average fixation durations (ms) on the LDT 
during the third baseline interval and the first performance interval.  The performance interval 1 
estimated adjusted means were evaluated at baseline interval 3 = 949 (ms).  Values in 
parentheses represent one standard error of the mean. 
 
 














Control (n = 15) 940 (49) 908 (50) 910 (39) 33 (40) 
Ongoing Emphasis (n = 14) 1028 (49) 995 (47) 970 (42) 33 (73) 
No Emphasis (n = 14) 955 (49) 991 (40) 990 (41) -36 (45) 
PM Emphasis (n = 14) 874 (52) 816 (31) 839 (41) 59 (47) 
 
The duration results did not yield a significant effect of block F(1, 53) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 
= .01.  There was a significant effect of group F(3, 53) = 3.45, p = .02, p2 = .16, and the 
interaction was not significant F(3, 53) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .03.  The group main effect was 
driven by significant differences between the ongoing emphasis condition and the PM emphasis 
conditions (p = .02).  The results of the ANCOVA revealed a significant relationship between 
baseline and performance fixation durations F(1, 52) = 7.89, p = .01, p2 = .13, and no effect of 
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group during the performance block F(3, 52) = 2.62, p = .06, p2 = .13.  The group trend was 
driven by differences between the ongoing and PM emphasis groups and none of the PM groups 
were statistically different from the control group.  The amount of time spent looking at the LDT 
stimulus mimics the overall response latency results.  These results are not surprising considering 
that close to 99% of the time of each trial was spent looking at the LDT stimulus as opposed to 
other screen locations, including the color box area.   
Table 7 
Number of Fixations on the LDT.  Values are the average number of fixations on the LDT during 
the third baseline interval and the first performance interval.  The performance interval 1 
estimated adjusted means were evaluated at baseline interval 3 = 2.3.  Values in parentheses 
represent one standard error of the mean. 
 
 














Control (n = 14) 2.0 (0.2) 1.9 (0.1) 2.0 (0.1) 0.1 (0.1) 
Ongoing Emphasis (n = 14) 2.5 (0.2) 2.3 (0.1) 2.2 (0.1) 0.3 (0.2) 
No Emphasis (n = 15) 2.2 (0.2) 2.3 (0.2) 2.3 (0.1) -0.1 (0.2) 
PM Emphasis (n = 15) 2.5 (0.3) 2.1 (0.1) 2.1 (0.1) 0.4 (0.1) 
 
The results on the number of fixations made per trial were slightly different from the 
fixation duration results.  The effect of block was not significant, F(1, 54) = 3.24, p = .08, p2 = 
.05, the effect of group was not significant F(3, 54) = 1.23, p > .05, p2 = .06, and the interaction 
also failed to reach significance F(3, 54) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .05.  The ANCOVA showed that 
the number of fixations made at baseline was related to the number of fixations made during the 
performance block F(1, 53) = 22.15, p < .01, p2 = .30, but there was no effect of group at 
performance F(3, 53) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .05.  Together the results from the duration and 
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number of fixations suggests that participants made slightly fewer fixations during the 
performance interval compared to baseline, but this did not affect the overall amount of time 
spent processing the LDT stimulus, nor did the PM instructions have an effect on these variables. 
The same variables were calculated for the “Next” slide.  There were no differences 
between the baseline and performance blocks in the duration F(1, 50) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .00, 
nor in the number of fixations made F(1, 51) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .02.  There were also no 
group differences in the “Next” duration measure F(3, 50) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .05, nor the 
number of fixations F(3, 51) = 1.93, p > .05, p2 = .10.  Both interactions also failed to reach 
significance: duration F(3, 50) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .01, and number of fixations F(3, 51) < 
1.00, p > .05, p2 = .04.  The duration ANCOVA results did reveal a significant relationship 
between baseline and performance looking times F(1, 49) = 13.66, p < .01, p2 = .22, but 
accounting for baseline processing duration did not reveal significant differences between  the 
groups at performance F(3, 49) < 1.00, p > .05, p2 = .05.  Interestingly, the results of the 
ANCOVA on the number of fixations made on the “Next” slide did not reveal a relationship 
between baseline and performance fixations F(1, 50) = 2.11, p > .05, p2 = .04, and the null 
effects at performance persisted F(3, 50) = 1.25, p > .05, p2 = .07.  The eye movement results 
from the “Next” slide further suggest that monitoring did not occur at this point in the trial. 
Monitoring processes in the form of checking for the cue were expected to be manifested 
in the number of fixations on the color change area on non-change trials and the proportion of 
time spent processing on this area.  In other words, if participants thought about the intention and 
needed to check to see if they should make their PM response, they were expected to look at the 
color change area.  Furthermore, if the color change area was fixated, participants in the PM 
groups were expected to spend more time looking at the area than the control group suggesting 
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they were retrieving information about the intention.  This did not turn out to be the case.  The 
color box area was very rarely fixated upon on non-change trials both during baseline and 
performance.  In fact, most participants never looked at the color change area and those that did 
usually made a single fixation.  There were also no group differences in the proportion of time 
spent looking at the color change area during baseline and performance, nor were there any 
group differences.  During baseline, participants were more likely to fixate upon the color box on 
the few trials following a change.  During the performance block, this pattern carried on for the 
control group, but the PM participants who looked at the color change area were likely to look at 
random times throughout the block.  The latter finding may indicate that a few of the PM 
participants did feel compelled to check for the cue, while the control participants looked 
because the change captured their attention.   The proportion of participants in each group who 
fixated upon the color box is displayed in Figure 7.   
 
Eye Tracking Condition Proportion that Fixated Upon the Color Box 
 
Figure 7 
Eye Tracking Condition Proportion that Fixated Upon the Color Box.  Bars represent the 
proportion of participants in each group who fixated upon the color box at least once during the 





























Interestingly, few participants looked at the color change area on change trials although, 
all participants indicated in the post-experiment questionnaire that they noticed the change and 
several were able to correctly recall the colors that appeared.  This finding supports the 
prediction that the change would be distinct and very noticeable.  
6.4 Predictor Measures  
 Bivariate correlations were first conducted to determine the relationship between PM 
performance and the results from each predictor measure.  If the predictor variable was related to 
PM performance, the relationship was further examined through a multiple regression model.  
The first predictor variable was working memory capacity assessed by Ospan performance.  
Ospan performance was calculated as a cumulative score based on the number of letters correctly 
remembered in serial order across all of the trials.  Only participants who maintained their math 
accuracy at 85% or better were included in the Ospan analyses.   
The second predictor measure was Stroop performance, designed to assess each 
individual’s ability to inhibit irrelevant information.  Two variables were created from this task: 
the number of response errors made to color word trials (e.g., reading the word “red” instead of 
stating the color it was presented) and the difference in response latency between color word 
trials and neutral word trials (words unrelated to colors presented in a color) when a correct 
response was given.  As mentioned in the methods section, the Stroop task was designed such 
that the computer generated 90 trials and repeated the sequence.  There were a few instances 
where the color or word that appeared on trials 90 and 91were related (e.g., “green” or “red” in 
green print).  Cases where such a match occurred were removed from the dataset.  The data were 
also trimmed to exclude trials faster than 200 ms because they often occurred due to microphone 
errors.  Trials exceeding three standard deviations beyond the participant’s mean response 
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latencies were also excluded.  This resulted in a loss of less than 3% of the data in both the 
behavioral only and eye tracking conditions.  Participants who indicated that they were 
colorblind in their demographics questionnaire were excluded from the results (behavioral only n 
= 2; eye tracking n = 1). 
The final set of variables included in the bivariate correlations came from the 
demographics questionnaire and the post-experiment questionnaire.  The eye movement data 
were also included (for the eye tracking group).  Responses to each of the questions were 
included in the bivariate correlations to determine whether any were related to PM performance.  
Variables that were significantly correlated with PM performance or those that were expected to 
correlate with PM performance are presented Tables 8 and 10.  Two-tailed Pearson’s correlations 
were run because there was not always a theoretical prediction for the direction of each 
relationship. 
As previously shown, PM performance was significantly correlated with processing 
speed when the PM cue appeared.  Table 8 also shows that PM performance was negatively 
correlated with how difficult participants in the behavioral only PM groups rated the task set, 
indicating that those who rated the combination of the LDT and PM tasks as being easier were 
more likely to remember to carry out the intention.  PM performance was also positively 
correlated with participants’ use of strategies.  The last question on the post-experiment 
questionnaire inquired about strategy use.  Responses were scored from 0 to 3 and higher values 
indicated strategies that were less likely to reflect monitoring processes.  If participants said they 
did not use a strategy, their response was marked as 0, if they said they searched for the cue and 
thought about the PM task throughout, their response was marked as a 1, if they said they the 
intention popped into mind, but sometimes thought about the cue, their response was marked as 
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2, and last, if they said they did not think about the PM cue until it appeared, i.e. it popped into 
mind, their response was marked as a 3.  Most participants’ responses were marked as either a 3 
or 1, with very few 2’s and no 0’s.  Thus, the correlation with strategy indicates that participants 
in the behavioral only condition who subjectively stated that they did not monitor for the PM cue 
were more successful at the PM task.   
Table 8 
Behavioral Only Condition Bivariate Correlations.  Values significant at  = .05 are marked with 
a single asterisk (*) and values significant at  = .01 are marked with two (**).  Variable 8 was 
the only demographic result related to PM performance and variables 9 to 11 were the only post-
experiment outcomes related to PM performance. 
 
Behavioral Only Condition Bivariate Correlations 
  
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. PM 1          
2. PM Latency   .52** 1         
3. Change Trial 
Latency 
  .49** .42** 1        
4. Performance 
Interval 1 Latency 
.13 .25** .35** 1       
5. Ospan Score .07 .01 -.03 .02 1      
6. Stroop Word 
Errors 
   -.02 -.06 -.03 .00 -.13 1     
7. Stroop Latency 
Difference 
-.16 .01 .21* .08 -.01 .02 1    
8. Anxiety 
Medication 
 .21* .11 .07 -.03 -.08 .01 -.13 1   
9. Effort Toward 
LDT 
-.12 -.25** .00 -.23* -.23* .14 -.13 -.04 1  
10. Difficulty to do 
Both 
 -.27** -.26** -.17 .05 .01 .01 .14 -.09 -.02 1 




Surprisingly, the only demographics question related to PM performance was whether 
participants were taking any anxiety medications (1 = yes; 2 = no).  The positive correlation 
shows that participants who were not taking anxiety medications were more likely to complete 
the intention than those taking these medications.  However, this outcome is to be interpreted 
with caution as there were only four participants who indicated that they were taking anxiety 
medications. 
Interestingly, how much effort participants devoted to the LDT over the PM task did not 
correlate with PM performance, but it did correlate with their response latencies.  The negative 
correlation between effort and PM latencies, and effort and performance block interval 1 
latencies indicated that participants who devoted less effort to the LDT and more effort to the 
PM task were slower than those who placed more effort on the LDT.  Notably, which task they 
devoted more effort toward did not directly influence PM performance.  Effort also correlated 
with Ospan performance suggesting that those who scored higher in the Ospan task were more 
likely to place effort toward the PM task.   
Also of interest were the Ospan and Stroop correlations which did not relate with PM 
performance.  Ospan scores did not correlate with either measure of Stroop performance.  These 
results do not replicate Kane and Engle (2003) who found that Ospan performance predicted 
slowing in the Stroop task when all or most of the Stroop trials were incongruent like the current 
Stroop task; However, the results are in line with findings obtained by Miyake, et al. (2000).  In 
their work, Miyake et al. (2000) found evidence through structural equation modeling that Ospan 
and Stroop performance measured separate executive functions.  Specifically, Ospan 
performance was related to the ability to update information in memory and Stroop performance 
was related to the ability to inhibit irrelevant information.  From their conclusions, it is not 
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surprising that a relationship between Ospan and Stroop performance was not found in the 
current results because updating and inhibition were thought to be distinguishable functions.  The 
implications of these results are considered in the discussions section.  Lastly, the difference in 
response latencies between correct color word trials and correct neutral word trials in the Stroop 
task was correlated with processing speed when making an LDT judgment on the change trial.   
Table 9 
Behavioral Only Condition Regression Model.  Values significant at  = .05 are marked with a 
single asterisk (*) and values significant at  = .01 are marked with two (**).   
 
Behavioral Only Condition Regression Model 
Variable  Semipartial r t-value  R2 
PM Latency .38 .34 4.28** .42** 
Change Trial Latency .35 .33 4.35** 
Difficulty to do Both -.10 -.10 -0.98 
Strategy .05 .05 0.41   
 
Note – R2 = .42, F(4, 97) = 17.66, p < .01. 
 
To determine which variables most strongly predicted PM performance, the variables that 
correlated with PM were entered simultaneously into a multiple regression analysis.  Although 
the use of anxiety medications was correlated with PM performance, this variable was not 
included in the regression model because there were so few participants who indicated that they 
were taking such medications.  The outcome of regression model for the behavioral only 
condition is in Table 9.  The table includes beta values (), semipartial correlations, the 
significance test (t (97)) for each predictor variable, and the multiple R2 value for the entire 
model.  The multiple regression model was able to account for 42% of the variance in PM 
performance.  Moreover, the only two significant predictors were response latencies when 
participants were supposed to make their PM responses and response latencies when participants 
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made LDT decisions in the face of the PM cues.  Although the other variables were related to 
PM performance, they cannot be used to predict PM performance in the current paradigm.  These 
results again suggest that the distinctiveness of the PM cue overrode perceptions of the difficulty 
of the task set, strategy, and the use of medications that may otherwise interfere with 
performance.   
Bivariate correlations were also conducted for the eye tracking condition.  These data can 
be found in Table 10.  The response latency results were very similar to the fixation duration 
results.  As such the former were excluded from the table to prevent duplication.  The results 
were similar to the behavioral only correlations showing that PM performance was significantly 
correlated with processing speed when the PM cue appeared, and with the use of a waiting or 
pop-up strategy.  The use of a pop-up strategy was also related to greater slowing when 
participants were to make their PM response.  However, none of the demographic variables 
correlated with PM performance, nor did the post-experiment variables intended to assess 
participants’ perceptions of task difficulty. 
Also of interest were the Ospan and Stroop correlations which did not relate with PM 
performance.  Ospan score did correlate with the response latencies when participants were 
supposed to make their PM response.  These results suggest that participants who scored lower in 
working memory capacity slowed more at this juncture than those who scored higher.  In 
contrast to the behavioral only condition, Ospan score did correlate with Stroop performance.  
The results replicate Kane and Engle (2003) showing that participants who scored lower in the 
Ospan task experienced greater slowing on color word trials than neutral word trials compared to 






Eye Tracking Condition Bivariate Correlations.  Values significant at  = .05 are marked with a 
single asterisk (*) and values significant at  = .01 are marked with two (**).  Variable 9 was the 
only post-experiment outcome related to PM performance. 
 
Eye Tracking Condition Bivariate Correlations 
    
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. PM 1        
2. PM Latency .38*   1       
3. Change Trial 
Fixation Duration 
  .66**  .67** 1      
4. Change Trial 
Fixation Count 
.38*  .61** .62** 1     
5. Interval 1 Fixation 
Duration 
-.08 .10 .06 .18 1    
6. Ospan Score     .09 -.29* -.22 -.21 -.04 1   
7. Stroop Word Errors -.05 .27* .09 -.04 -.25 -.06 1  
8. Stroop Latency 
Difference 
.01 .10 .18  .06 .00  -.35**     .19 1 
9. Strategy .40** .35* .19 -.15 .03 -.09 .03 .20 
 
Variables that shared a significant correlation with PM were entered simultaneously into 
a multiple regression analysis to determine which might actually predict PM performance.  The 
outcome of the regression model for the behavioral only condition is in Table 11.  The table 
includes beta values (), semipartial correlations, the significance test (t (34)) for each predictor 
variable, and the multiple R2 value for the entire model.  The multiple regression model was able 
to account for 50% of the variance in PM performance.  To prevent issues with multicollinearity, 
the response latency results that correlated with PM performance were not included with the 
exception of response latencies when the PM response was supposed to be made.  Unlike the 
behavioral only condition, the only two significant predictors were the amount of time spent 
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processing the LDT when the change occurred and the type of strategy that was employed.  The 
outcome of the regression analysis suggests that slowing in the presence of the cue benefits PM 
performance, and that the use of a pop-up strategy was advantageous in the current paradigm.  
Table 11 
Eye Tracking Condition Regression Model.  Values significant at  = .05 are marked with a 
single asterisk (*) and values significant at  = .01 are marked with two (**).   
 
Eye Tracking Condition Regression Model 
Variable  Semipartial r t-value  R2 
PM Latency -0.12 -0.09 -0.71 .50** 
Change Trial Fixation 
Duration 
0.58 0.43 3.54** 
 
Change Trial Fixation 
Count 
0.18 0.14 1.15 
 
Strategy 0.26 0.25 2.04*   
 




Chapter 7 General Discussion 
 The purpose of the present study was to improve our current understanding of the 
cognitive processes that are carried out in event-based PM tasks.  Of major debate in the 
literature is the extent that resource demanding processes are required to complete these tasks.  
Where some have found that event-based PM intentions can be completed without consuming 
additional attentional resources beyond those required to complete the ongoing task (e.g., 
Einstein et al., 2005), others have found that adding an intention to the ongoing task taps a 
resource pool that must be shared between the two tasks, negatively influencing ongoing 
performance (e.g., Smith et al., 2007).  A precedent has been set to examine the cognitive 
processes involved in PM tasks by measuring the response latencies during the ongoing task.  
However, it is possible that response latencies capture processes that are not directly related to 
the task set (e.g., Marsh et al., 2005).  If this is the case, response latencies provide an equivocal 
estimate of the cognitive processes carried out in event-based PM tasks. 
The two main goals established for this study were first, to examine whether the current 
design was sufficient to evoke spontaneous retrieval of the intention or whether monitoring 
processes would be required to support retrieval.  The second goal was to determine if eye 
movement measures would provide a better measure of the cognitive processes carried out in an 
event-based PM task over response latencies alone.  Of particular interest, was whether eye 
movements would be sensitive enough to detect monitoring processes that were not detected 
through the response latency results.  The predictions and findings for each goal are further 
considered. 
The Preparatory Attentional view and multiprocess view make contrasting predictions 
regarding the use of monitoring processes.  According to the Preparatory Attentional view, there 
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should have been evidence of monitoring in both the behavioral results and they eye movement 
results; however, the multiprocess view predicts that the current task conditions were likely to 
support spontaneous retrieval and eliminate monitoring processes.  The behavioral results 
supported the multiprocess view, and did not suggest that monitoring occurred nor that it would 
have been beneficial to PM performance.  Participants in the PM groups in both the behavioral 
only and eye tracking conditions displayed comparable performance to their control group in the 
ongoing LDT.  The fixation duration and number of fixation results replicated the behavioral 
measures, even though these measures were expected to be more sensitive and more likely to 
detect evidence of monitoring.   
Importantly, the results showed that the PM cue was distinct and noticeable and that these 
qualities led to spontaneous retrieval of the intention.  In both the behavioral only and eye 
tracking conditions, when the color change appeared at baseline, everyone slowed significantly.  
In comparison, only the PM groups slowed when the color change appeared during the 
performance block.  These results suggest that the PM cue captured attention at baseline, and at 
performance only those with a goal to respond to the change took notice.  Evidence of 
spontaneous retrieval was further supported by the striking similarity in response latencies on the 
pre-change trial during the performance block for all of the groups in each condition followed by 
the exaggerated slowing that occurred in the PM conditions on the PM trial.  It is essential to 
point out that this slowing occurred as soon as the change appeared and was not a result of the 
PM participants making the PM response while the control participants made a lexical decision.  
The eye movement results showed that this slowing occurred even though most participants did 
not look at the color change area.  Many participants slowed, but maintained fixation on the LDT 
stimulus.   
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Further support for the multiprocess view arose in the PM accuracy results.  Participants 
were highly successful at the PM task even though evidence of monitoring was not found, 
suggesting that these additional resources were not necessary.  Although PM performance was 
very high, there still appears to be room for improvement.  The PM results suggest that the 
distinctiveness of the color change did capture attention and for most participants enabled them 
to stop processes devoted to the LDT and retrieve information related to the PM tasks.  This type 
of cue may not supersede focal ongoing and PM tasks.  As previously noted, the multiprocess 
view predicts that PM performance benefits from an overlap in the cognitive processes required 
to complete the PM task and the ongoing task.  Thus if the ongoing task also required perceptual 
processing, PM performance may improve.  In addition, the assumption was made that general 
PM instructions would reduce the cognitive load associated with the PM task compared to 
specific instructions to respond to a predetermined color; however, this was not directly tested in 
the current study.  Finally, Yantis and Jonides (1990) found that highly focused attention may 
prevent stimulus onsets from automatically capturing attention.  It is possible that missed PM 
responses were a result of such highly focused attention.  It would be worthwhile for future 
research to examine whether focal processing and/or specific PM instructions would improve 
PM performance in the current paradigm without finding evidence of monitoring. 
In regard to the first goal, the behavioral and eye tracking results from the current study 
supported the multiprocess view and showed that the current conditions were sufficient to 
support PM performance without monitoring and also elicited spontaneous retrieval of the 
intention.  In comparison, conclusive evidence showing that eye movements provided a better 
estimate of monitoring processes than response latencies was not obtained.  This, however, 
should be interpreted with caution because null results were obtained in both measures regarding 
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monitoring processes.  Although evidence of monitoring was not obtained, the eye movement 
data did provide insight into the cognitive processes that were engaged during the change trial.  
Additionally, the eye movement results provided insight into potential individual differences in 
“checking” behaviors. 
The eye movement data showed that while most participants were able to make their PM 
response without fixating on the color box on the PM trial, those that did fixate on the PM cue all 
remembered to complete the intention.  None of the participants who missed the PM response 
ever fixated on the PM cue.  This is in contrast to West et al. (2007) who found that on close to 
50% of missed PM trials, participants actually fixated on the PM cue.  The current results shed 
some light on how the PM cue captures attention and suggests that when the PM cue is strong 
enough to capture overt attention, PM success is highly likely. In contrast, when only covert 
attention is captured, PM success may still occur but the rate of success declines.  In addition, 
participants who never looked at the color box on the change trial and forgot to carry out the 
intention may exemplify those proposed by Yantis and Jonides (1990) to be engaged in highly 
focused attention away from the onset, which prevented the onset from automatically capturing 
attention.   
The eye movement results were also expected to provide insight about individual 
differences in monitoring, if they occurred.  In general evidence of monitoring was not found, 
but there was initial evidence suggesting that some participants occasionally checked the box 
color.  Some participants were more likely to look at the color change area, although very 
infrequently.  In the current study, very few participants ever checked the box color on the non-
change trials, but the pattern of results from the performance block may indicate monitoring 
behaviors.  During the performance block control participants were likely to look at the box 
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immediately following a change.  In contrast, the PM participants who looked on non-change 
trials were more likely to do so at random points throughout the block.  These results suggest that 
control participants looked at the box because the change caught their attention.  However, the 
PM participants’ random checking may point to instances where the participant consciously 
oriented overt attention toward the box or instances where overt attention was oriented outside of 
conscious awareness.  In either case, they represent shifts in overt attention that may resemble 
monitoring processes, and that likely would not be detected by the response latency results.  
Response latencies on these trials were not much different from trials where participants did not 
check the box color.  It is possible that the some of the discrepant findings in the literature were 
in part due to the degree that response latencies detect processes not associated with the task set 
and individual differences in checking behaviors.  In other paradigms, where the cue may not be 
as distinct but monitoring was still not theoretically necessary, there may have been a larger 
number of participants who actually “checked” for the cue or a few who “checked” often who 
went unnoticed because checking was not directly assessed.  Although broad evidence of 
monitoring was not found in the eye movement results, they did provide greater insight into the 
cognitive processes carried out during the ongoing task and when participants made or missed 
the opportunity to make the PM response.  
Another potential concern was related to participants’ perceptions of the task set, which 
may confound the results reported in the literature.  This issue was dealt with in two ways: first, 
by instructing PM participants to place emphasis on one task over the other, and second, by 
directly assessing their perceptions at the end of the experiment session.  The current results did 
not show meaningful differences between the PM groups, nor did perceptions of difficulty 
influence evidence of monitoring.  These results suggest that the qualities of the task set, such as 
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the very noticeable PM cue, likely served to mitigate the influence of the instructions and 
perceptions of the task set.  Participants tended to rate the task set as not difficult, almost all of 
the participants said they placed more effort on the LDT over the PM task, and similarly said 
they thought the LDT was the most important component.  Preference was given to the LDT in 
both effort and importance, regardless of the PM emphasis instructions.  Thus, under the current 
conditions where the task set was universally perceived as easy, emphasis instructions and 
attention allocation policies did not influence the results.  Attention allocation policies are 
thought to be set based on an individual’s perceptions of the task set.  If everyone’s perception is 
the same, then there should not be variability in attention allocation policies.  
The final outcome of the current study showed that slowing that occurs when the PM cue 
appears is the best predictor of PM performance.  This was the case for both the behavioral 
results and the eye movement results.  Additionally, the results did not show an influence of 
working memory ability or inhibitory abilities on PM performance.  This outcome is in line with 
the multiprocess view that the current design did not require monitoring and therefore should not 
be related to attentional measures.   
The current findings provide support for the multiprocess view, in additions to providing 
fruitful evidence from eye movement measures.  However, there are a few limitations to the 
current study that need to be addressed.  First, there were a few inconsistencies in the behavioral 
results between the behavioral only condition and the eye tracking condition.  Some of these 
issues were likely caused by low power in the eye tracking condition.  For instance, the 
behavioral only condition showed significantly faster response latencies in the performance 
block interval compared to the baseline block interval.  The effect of block failed to reach 
significance in the eye tracking condition, but the effect size obtained from each analysis was 
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similar (behavioral only condition, p2 = .06; eye tracking condition p2 = .04).  These results 
suggest that the effect of block accounted for a similar amount of the variance, but there was not 
enough power in the eye tracking condition for the results to reach significance.   
Similarly, the pattern of results obtained from the “Next” slide varied slightly.  This can 
likely be attributed to the different response mechanisms in each condition.  The “Next” response 
in the behavioral only condition was to press the spacebar on the keyboard.  This was a very easy 
response and one that participants likely had ample experience with before entering the 
experiment.  This would explain the very rapid “Next” response obtained by this condition as 
well as the similarity in responding.  In comparison, the “Next” response in the eye tracking 
condition was to press a button on the top of a game controller.  For participants without gaming 
experience, this may have proven to be a slightly more difficult response.  In fact, participants 
were often observed pressing the button more than once before a response was registered.  This 
may account for the improved latencies observed from baseline to performance.  Importantly, 
neither group showed evidence of monitoring during the “Next” slide. 
One major inconsistency that warrants a discussion is the difference in ANCOVA results 
on the performance block latencies with baseline as the covariate between the two experimental 
conditions.  The behavioral only condition showed poorer performance in the ongoing and PM 
emphasis conditions compared to the control condition.  At first glance, this outcome seems to 
resemble monitoring; however, it is not immediately clear why the ongoing emphasis group 
would show evidence of monitoring and the no emphasis condition would not show a similar 
pattern.  One alternative explanation is that emphasizing either task, increases the amount of 
cognitive resources given to the task set.  In turn, participants in the ongoing emphasis group 
may not have improved as much as expected because they were focused on improving accuracy 
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in the LDT during the performance block resulting in a trade-off in latency improvement.  In 
comparison, the PM emphasis group may have obtained a similar pattern of results because they 
did engage in monitoring processes to ensure that they remembered to complete the intention.  
This account can explain the intermediate results obtained in the no emphasis group.  The no 
emphasis group did not have the same incentive to focus on one task over the other allowing 
them to improve compared to baseline, but they also had an intention to maintain, preventing 
them from improving as much as the no intention control improved.  The latter account, that 
placing emphasis on either task increases the cognitive demand of the task set, seems to be more 
plausible.  However, the pattern of results from the eye tracking condition raises an issue for both 
accounts.  The PM emphasis group in the eye tracking condition showed the greatest 
improvement and the no emphasis group got slower during the performance block.  The 
ANCOVA results did not yield a significant effect of group, but this was likely a result of low 
power.  The simplest interpretation is that the small sample size of the eye tracking condition 
may be producing unreliable results.  Thus, if more participants were included in this condition 
the results may take on the pattern obtained from the behavioral only condition.  This 
inconsistent pattern of results presents a problem for the current study that limits the ability to 
generalize the findings.   
Finally, the relationship between Ospan and Stroop performance varied across the two 
experimental conditions.  First, no relationship was found between Ospan and Stroop 
performance in the behavioral only condition, but those with higher Ospan scores in the eye 
tracking condition were significantly less likely to slow on color word trials compared to neutral 
word trials (Stroop latency difference values).  The former finding supports Miyake et al. (2000) 
while the latter replicates Kane and Engle (2003).  Second, and markedly, the direction of the 
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correlation between Ospan score and Stroop word errors was different in the behavioral only 
condition than the eye tracking condition.  These conflicting outcomes may call into question the 
reliability of one or both tasks and the ability to generalize any relationships obtained between 
these variables, but are not thought to be a major limitation of the current study.  The main 
reason for including the Ospan and Stroop tasks was to determine if Ospan and Stroop 
performance were capable of predicting PM performance and monitoring.  As evidence of 
monitoring was not found, the relationship between Ospan score and monitoring and Stroop 
performance and monitoring is moot.  Because monitoring did not affect PM accuracy, the same 
argument can be made for the relationship between PM performance and Ospan score and PM 
performance and Stroop performance.  In other words, a relationship between Ospan score and 
variables affecting prospective memory and Stroop performance and variables affecting 
prospective memory were expected to occur only if the prospective task required attentional 
resources. 
Despite these limitations the value of the current proposal rests on the novel findings 
obtained from the eye movement results.  First, the results of the study have provided some 
insight into the discrepancies reported in the literature.  Second, the current methodology 
allowed the cognitive processes associated with the ongoing task and those associated with the 
PM task to be teased apart.  Third, the eye movement results have shown initial evidence that 
covert attention alone may not guarantee PM success, even though it may still occur.  
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Dependent Variables and Measures 
Variable or 
Measure 
Cognitive Process Assessed Influence on PM performance 
Correct LDT 
Response Latencies 
Amount of time required to make 
correct lexical decisions – longer 
responses by the PM groups 
indicates influence of monitoring 
Slower responding may increase the 
likelihood of completing the PM 
task 
PM Performance   
Fixation Durations 
on the LDT (correct 
responses) 
Amount of time required to make 
correct lexical decisions – longer 
responses by the PM groups 
indicates influence of monitoring 
Longer durations may increase the 
likelihood of completing the PM 
task 
Number of 
Fixations on the 
LDT (correct 
responses) 
Estimate of the resources required 
to make correct lexical decisions 
– more fixations by the PM 
groups indicated influence of 
monitoring 
More fixations may increase the 
likelihood of completing the PM 
task 
Ospan Working Memory Capacity 
Higher capacity scores should be 
related to better PM performance 
Stroop 
Ability to inhibit irrelevant 
information – more errors and 
greater response latency 
difference scores suggest worse 
ability to inhibit 
Fewer errors and lower difference 
scores should be related to better PM 
performance 
Task Set Difficulty Subjective index of difficulty 
Viewing the task set as difficult may 
increase likelihood that participants 
will engage in monitoring  
More Effort Subjective index of cognitive Devoting more effort away from the 
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Devoted to LDT effort devoted to the ongoing task PM task should decrease PM 
performance and evidence of 
monitoring 
More Effort 
Devoted to PM task 
Subjective index of cognitive 
effort devoted to the PM task 
Devoting more effort toward the PM 
task should increase PM 




Subjective index of task 
importance 
Should decrease PM performance 
and monitoring 
PM Most Important 
Subjective index of task 
importance 









1. Please indicate your grade level. 
a. Freshman 
b. Sophomore 
c. Junior, Senior 
d. 5th Year or More [Participants were instructed to answer this question based on 
the number of credit hours they had completed.  The 5th Year or More option only 
applied to graduate students.] 
2. Please indicate your gender. 
3. What is your Ethnicity? 
a. White 
b. African American 
c. Asian American 
d. Hispanic/Latino 
e. Native American 
f. Other 
4. Is English your first language? 
5. How many exams do you have this week? 
6. How much sleep have you had over the last 48 hours? 
7. How many 12 oz cups of caffeine have you consumed today? 
8. How many medications are you currently taking? 
a. What is the name of each medication? 
b. What is the purpose of each medication? 
9. Do you have normal, corrected to normal, or uncorrected vision? 
10. Are you red/green colorblind? 











Subject #: __________      Part 1 Exp Name: _____________________________________ 
1. Did you notice the box change colors during the last task?   
2. If so, how many times did it change colors? 
3. What colors did it change to? 
4. Please rate the difficulty of noticing this box color change on a scale of 1 (very easy) to 
10 (very difficult). 
5. Please rate the difficulty of the word/nonword task on a scale of 1 (very easy) to 10 (very 
difficult). 
6. Please indicate with an “X” on the line below, what proportion of your efforts were 
devoted to the color change task versus the word/nonword task.  If you did not receive 
instructions for the color change task, please skip this question. 
         
Effort more toward        Effort more toward 
Color Change Task         Word/Nonword Task 
7. Which task did you think was most important? If you did not receive instructions for the 
color change task, please skip this question. 
8. How difficult was it to perform both tasks together?  Please make your rating on a scale 
of 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult). If you did not receive instructions for the color 
change task in addition to the word/nonword task, please skip this question. 
9. Did you remember to complete the color change task?  
a. What were you instructed to do when you noticed a color change? 
10. If so, were you able to do so because you continuously searched for color changes or 
because it just popped into mind? 
  
                                                            
1 Participants in the control group only answered questions 1-5.  Question 1: “yes” responses were coded as 1 and 
“no” responses were coded as 2.  Question 6: the visual scale was converted into a numerical scale that ranged from 
1 to 9 with lower values indicating more effort toward the color change task, and higher values indicating more 
effort devoted to the word/nonword task. Question 7: 1 = word/nonword was indicated as most important, and 2 =  
PM task was most important.  Question 9: 0 = “no”, 1 = “once” (if this was indicated), and 2 = “yes”.  Question 10: 




Performance Block Instructions 
Control: In this experiment, we are also interested in your ability to perform different cognitive 
tasks.  You will engage in another task and then return to a task similar to the one you just 
completed. When you return to the word judgment task, you may occasionally notice one of the 
boxes on the screen change colors. Do your best to ignore these changes and continue making 
your word/nonword judgments.  You will have a few practice trials to familiarize yourself with 
this task.  Do you have any questions?  Press ENTER when you are ready to begin. 
Ongoing Emphasis: In this experiment, we are also interested in your ability to perform 
different cognitive tasks.  Specifically, we are interested in your memory for doing something in 
the future.  If at any point while you are making your word/nonword judgments you notice a 
color change in the bottom [top] center box, please press the tilde "~" key [B button].  Please 
press the "~" key [B button] AFTER you have made your word/nonword judgment, but 
BEFORE you press the SPACE bar.  You must press the "~" key [B button] anytime you 
encounter a color change. Pressing the "~" key [B button] will return the box to its original color.  
Although we are interested in your memory for this task, it is MOST important that you perform 
your word/nonword decisions as quickly and accurately as possible. Thus, please place emphasis 
on making word/nonword judgments.  You will have a few practice trials to familiarize yourself 
with this task.  Do you have any questions?  Press ENTER when you are ready to begin. 
No Emphasis: In this experiment, we are also interested in your ability to perform different 
cognitive tasks.  Specifically, we are interested in your memory for doing something in the 
future.  If at any point while you are making your word/nonword judgments you notice a color 
                                                            
2 The instructions in brackets, e.g., [top] and [B button] refer to the counterbalancing condition instructions and the 
eye tracking condition PM response respectively. 
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change in the bottom [top] center box, please press the tilde "~" key [B button].  Please press the 
"~" key [B button] AFTER you have made your word/nonword judgment, but BEFORE you 
press the SPACE bar.  You must press the "~" key [B button] anytime you encounter a color 
change. Pressing the "~" key [B button] will return the box to its original color.  You will have a 
few practice trials to familiarize yourself with this task.  Do you have any questions?  Press 
ENTER when you are ready to begin. 
PM Emphasis: In this experiment, we are also interested in your ability to perform different 
cognitive tasks.  Specifically, we are interested in your memory for doing something in the 
future.  If at any point while you are making your word/nonword judgments you notice a color 
change in the bottom [top] center box, please press the tilde "~" key [B button].  Please press the 
"~" key [B button] AFTER you have made your word/nonword judgment, but BEFORE you 
press the SPACE bar.  You must press the "~" key [B button] anytime you encounter a color 
change. Pressing the "~" [B button] key will return the box to its original color.  Although we are 
interested in your memory for this task and your ability to make word/nonword judgments, it is 
MOST important that you remember to press the "~" key [B button] when you encounter a color 
change. Thus, please place emphasis on noticing the color change and remembering to press the 
"~" key [B button].  You will have a few practice trials to familiarize yourself with this task.  Do 
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